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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
 
In this dissertation, I investigate two key questions: 1) What are the specific 
conditions under which economic inequality undermines democratic legitimacy; and 2) 
How does inequality map onto individuals’ perceptions of fairness and subsequently 
affect satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions?  I first argue that 
individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness are key factors whereby economic 
inequality undermines democratic legitimacy. Inequality - and subsequent perceptions 
that the economic distribution is unfair - undermine political support by signaling that the 
democratic process is not functioning properly and by challenging people’s normative 
expectations about what democracy should do in practice. 
I next draw from a diverse literature on social and political psychology, as well as 
governance quality, to derive new hypotheses about how people form their fairness 
judgments and use them to evaluate democracy. Right-leaning and upper-class 
individuals should be less upset with inequality in the first place, but even when these 
individuals perceive distributive unfairness, they should be less likely to express political 
dissatisfaction as a result. Additionally, the context in which individuals form their 
fairness perceptions should condition the relationship between fairness judgments and 
political support. In a context of good governance, individuals should be less likely to 
perceive inequality as unfair, and subsequently less likely to express political 
dissatisfaction for any perceived distributive unfairness in society. Governance quality 
provides alternative evidence that democracy is in fact functioning properly and should 
allay citizens’ concerns about inequality and distributive unfairness, at least when it 
comes to evaluating democratic legitimacy.   
To test my theory and hypotheses, I take a mixed-methods approach that 
combines large-N analysis of public opinion data and original survey experiments.  To 
contextualize my quantitative results, I draw on motivating examples from original open-
ended surveys, newspapers, and elite interviews. In the first empirical chapter, I conduct 
a multilevel analysis of data from 18 Latin American and show that perceptions of 
distributive unfairness are negatively correlated with trust in government and satisfaction 
with democracy, yet good governance significantly mitigates this negative relationship. 
In the second empirical chapter, I use original survey experiments in Argentina, Mexico, 
and the US to show that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key causal factors 
     
 
linking inequality to political dissatisfaction. In the third empirical chapter, I use a second 
set of survey experiments to investigate how governance quality moderates the 
relationship between inequality and political support. When individuals are presented 
with information about declining corruption, they are less likely to perceive their 
country’s income distribution as unfair, and less likely to link inequality to political 
dissatisfaction.  
 
KEYWORDS: Inequality, Distributive Fairness, Satisfaction with Democracy, Trust in 
Government, Corruption, Latin America  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The Americas host the highest levels of economic inequality in the world. 
Extreme levels of inequality challenge some of the core principles of democracy, such as 
“one person, one vote” by giving wealthy citizens undue political influence (Gilens 
2012). High levels of inequality moreover pose serious challenges for the deepening and 
strengthening of democracy in regions such as the Americas.  Not only does economic 
inequality challenge societal and democratic norms about equality of opportunity for all 
citizens, but it challenges citizens’ normative expectations about the outcomes that 
democracy is supposed to produce (Singh and Carlin 2015).  In this dissertation, I 
investigate the specific conditions under which economic inequality erodes support for 
democratic institutions. In particular, I ask how do individuals’ fairness judgments affect 
satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions?  
Prior research has demonstrated a robust empirical correlation between high 
levels of economic inequality and low levels of political support, such as support for 
democracy (Córdova and Seligson 2010; Krieckhaus et al. 2014), satisfaction with 
democracy (Anderson and Singer 2008); and political trust (Zmerli and Castillo 2015). 
Yet, our understanding of the relationship between these concepts remains incomplete. 
First, this research does not establish a causal mechanism linking inequality to 
evaluations of democracy. It is unclear, for instance, whether citizens blame the 
government for economic inequality, or which groups of citizens dislike inequality the 
most. It is also unclear how the quality of democratic procedures in a country – e.g., the 
extent of corruption – affects the relationship between economic inequality and citizens’ 
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evaluations of the political system.  My dissertation seeks to fill these scholarly voids by 
examining the conditions under which economic inequality leads to political 
dissatisfaction. 
1.2 Democratic Stability and the Sources of Political Legitimacy 
Democratic consolidation depends of the legitimacy of democratic government, 
and upon democracy becoming “the only game in town” for both masses and elites (Linz 
and Stepan 1996). In everyday language, we often think of legitimacy as the recognition 
that a political authority has the right to rule, or more generally as “citizen support for the 
government” (Booth and Seligson 2009, 8).  Easton (1975, 451) defines legitimacy as 
“the conviction that it is right and proper…to accept and obey the authorities and abide 
by the requirements of the regime” (451), and extant literature argues that legitimacy, or 
political support, is important for citizen acquiescence, especially with regard to policies 
and political outcomes that people disagree with (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; 
Tankebe 2013; Tyler 2004).   
Despite its importance, however, public opinion data suggests that political 
support, such as trust in government and satisfaction with democracy, is at troubling low 
levels throughout the Americas.  As Figure 1.1 illustrates, citizens in Mexico, Peru, El 
Salvador, and Brazil exhibit troubling low levels of trust in government – around 20 
percent indicating that they trust the government “some” or “a lot” – compared to citizens 
in countries such as Uruguay or the Dominican Republic who exhibit higher levels of 
political support.  Likewise, less than a quarter of respondents in Mexico and Brazil 
indicated in the 2015 Latinobarometer survey that they are satisfied with the way 
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democracy functions in their country.  Granted, there is also substantial variation in these 
measures of political support across the region.  Citizens in Uruguay, for instance, 
express overwhelming trust in government and satisfaction with democracy.  
Nevertheless, the low levels of political support observed in a number of  these countries 
raise important questions about the democratic stability and the widespread “democratic 
buy in” that is vital for democracy to consolidate (Linz and Stepan 1996). 
Figure 1.1 Support for the Political System in Latin America 
   
Source: 2015 Latinobarometer.  Figures represent the percentage of respondents in each country 
indicating at least some positive amount of trust in government or satisfaction with democracy.   
 
In addition to citizens expressing general mistrust of and dissatisfaction with 
democratic institutions, a number of countries in the region are experiencing crises of 
representation (Mainwaring 2006), party system collapses (Morgan 2011; Tanaka 2006); 
and the rise of undemocratic populist leaders (Mayorga 2006).  In Brazil, for instance, 
recent high-profile corruption scandals coupled with a severe economic recession and 
rising poverty and inequality have left citizens disillusioned with their democratic 
institutions.1  In 2018, amid this growing dissatisfaction with democracy, Brazilian 
                                                 
1 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-brazil-nostalgia-grows-for-
the-dictatorship--not-the-brutality-but-the-law-and-order/2018/03/14/bc58ded2-1cdd-
11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7fe0436d084 
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citizens turned to the far-right populist Jair Bolsonaro in the presidential election.  
Bolsonaro has expressed hostility toward civil rights and liberties, especially concerning 
indigenous and LGBT communities.  He has even praised Brazil’s brutal military 
dictatorship and indicated that in an effort to combat crime, Brazilian police should be 
given immunity to kill suspected criminals (Phillips 2018).   
Scholars have grappled to understand why mass support for political institutions 
is so low in a number of countries throughout the Americas.  Dissatisfaction with 
democracy has been linked to poor economic performance (Booth and Seligson 2009; 
Dalton 2004), majoritarian electoral systems (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cho and 
Bratton 2006), and election scandals (Kumlin and Esaisson 2012).  A growing body of 
literature further argues that poor governance and weak state capacity have resulted in a 
“crisis of representation,” characterized by widespread disillusionment and 
disenchantment with democratic institutions (e.g., Mainwaring 2006), in a number of 
Latin American countries.  Indeed, poor governance quality – i.e., a lack of impartiality 
in the exercise of political authority (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) – is associated with 
decreased satisfaction not only in Latin America (Weitz-Shapiro 2008), but in new and 
mature democracies more generally (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). 
In this dissertation, I investigate another important factor that prior research has 
linked to low levels of trust in the national government and satisfaction with democracy: 
economic inequality (Anderson and Singer 2008; Zmerli and Castillo 2015).  
Specifically, I argue that citizens’ perceptions of the income distribution are key factors 
whereby inequalities in society translate into political dissatisfaction.  Individuals are 
generally less satisfied when democratic outcomes do not match their normative 
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expectations about what democracy should do in practice (Singh and Carlin 2015).  When 
citizens perceive or experience distributive unfairness – for example, when they perceive 
their country’s income distribution as unfair – this signals that the democratic process is 
not producing the outcomes it was intended to produce (Meltzer and Richards 1981).   
I also argue that the way in which economic inequality maps onto individuals’ 
perceptions of distributive unfairness and subsequent political evaluations depends upon 
individual-level factors such as political ideology and class-status, as well as the context 
of governance quality in a country.  Although I expect that all individuals should, on 
average, be less likely to support their democratic institutions when they perceive 
distributive unfairness in society, this negative relationship should be weaker among 
upper-class individuals and those on the right of the political spectrum.  Additionally, I 
argue that good governance should mitigate the negative influence of perceived 
distributive unfairness on support for the political system.   
To test my theory, I rely on a mixed-methods approach that combines multilevel 
analyses of large-N, cross-national survey data, as well as original survey experiments 
from Argentina, Mexico, and the United States.  I also draw on motivating examples 
from newspapers and elite interviews in Argentina, as well as original qualitative survey 
data from the U.S., to contextualize the quantitative results from my cross-national 
analyses and survey experiments. 
1.3 Why the Americas? 
In terms of income inequality, Latin America is the most unequal region in the 
entire world (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010).  Moreover, the three most unequal OECD 
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countries are in the Americas: Chile comes in first, followed by Mexico and the United 
States.   Today, most countries in the Americas are democracies, but many countries in 
the region face a number of challenges with democratic consolidation.  Particularly, I 
argue that the high levels of inequality in this region compromise both political support 
and the quality of democratic representation. Amid rising poverty, inequality, and 
violence in Mexico, for instance, voters reinstated the PRI in 2012, thus returning the 
party that undemocratically dominated Mexican politics for most of the 20th century. 
The Americas can be thought of an ideal case to test the above theory and 
hypotheses.  The first empirical chapter of this dissertation employs a large-N cross-
national analysis of 18 Latin American countries, and the remaining two empirical 
chapters focus on the United States, Mexico, and Argentina.  In many ways, this choice 
of three countries can be thought of as approximating a “most similar” research design, or 
a case selection technique that results in two or more cases that are similar on specified 
variables other than the outcome variable and key explanatory variables of interest (Mill 
1872; Seawright and Gerring 2008). Seawright and Gerring (2008) explain that most 
similar cases that are broadly representative of the population and provide the strongest 
basis for generalization.  From a simplified perspective, these cases can be thought of as 
“most similar” in that background factors such as actual levels of inequality are similar, 
yet there is significant variation on both beliefs about the government’s role in the 
economy – especially when it comes to addressing inequality – and support for the 
political system.  
As Figure 1.2 shows, the United States and Argentina have similar levels of 
satisfaction with the way democracy works in each country, while Mexicans are  
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Figure 1.2 Public Opinion in Mexico, Argentina, and the United States 
 
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) 2014 AmericasBarometer  
 
generally less satisfied with the way their democracy works in practice.  Meanwhile, 
Figure 1.2 shows that Mexican and Argentine citizens believe that the government should 
play a much heavier role in addressing inequality, compared to citizens in the United 
States. Citizens in Mexico and Argentina also express some of the strongest preferences 
in Latin American for statist economic policies, such as those that reduce inequality, 
ensure citizens’ economic and social wellbeing, and place important industries in state 
hands (Carnes and Lupu 2015).  In many ways, this key difference makes the United 
States a hard test of my theory: if US citizens do not believe that the government should 
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address inequality, then it is less likely that these individuals will see inequality as unfair 
and/or blame the government for inequality and distributive unfairness. 
In Chapter 2, I develop hypotheses that an individual’s political ideology should 
condition the relationship between perceptions of inequality and fairness, and political 
support.  Specifically, I theorize that left-leaning individuals are more likely to moralize 
unjust outcomes and are less likely to rely on legitimizing stereotypes that justify 
inequality, and hence should be more likely to blame the government for distributive 
unfairness.  A typical component of left-right ideological placement is economic 
preferences.  The classic understanding, based on ideological cleavages that formed the 
basis for party systems in Europe, is that people on the Left prefer more government 
involvement in the economy, whereas people on the Right prefer less. In some Latin 
American countries, however, economic preferences do not map onto ideological 
identification so clearly.  In fact, economic preferences only predict left-right placement 
in 10 of the 18 Latin American countries and in Honduras, statist economic preferences 
predict Right self-placement, rather than Left (Zechmeister 2015).  However, the 
relationship between economic preferences and political ideology is more or less similar 
in Mexico, Argentina, and the United States.  Thus, these three cases are ideal for testing 
hypotheses derived from arguments about left-right semantics around individuals’ 
economic preference.   
In many ways, Argentina and the U.S. are ideal cases for testing my theory. First, 
Argentina and the United States have very similar levels of income inequality (as 
measured by the Gini coefficient), although I expect significant variation in citizens’ 
perceptions of the fairness of the income distribution.  According to the most recent 
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World Bank figures, the U.S. has a Gini Index 41.06, and Argentina has an index of 42.7.  
Although these Gini figures are high by worldwide standards, they are some of the lower 
figures in the Americas.  Despite these common levels of inequality, however, there are 
theoretically important differences between the two countries.  First, as mentioned above, 
the two countries have very different social norms about what role the government should 
play in the economy.  This is important because it allows me to hold economic inequality 
relatively constant while leveraging significant variation in citizens’ normative 
expectations about the outcomes that democracy is supposed to produce. In the United 
States, public opinion data show that a majority of US respondents recognize that 
inequality in increasing, yet they do not agree on how to address it (McCall and 
Kenworthy 2009; Pew 2014).  For instance, Pew’s 2014 report shows that less than half 
of all Americans believe that government aid to the poor does more harm than good.  
Meanwhile, the majority of citizens in Argentina believe the government should play a 
heavy role in the economy, such as addressing inequality (Lupu 2016).  Therefore, 
Argentine citizens should be more likely than those in the US to expect the government 
to address inequality, and more likely to attribute blame for inequality to the government.   
Argentina is also an ideal case for testing my expectations that right-leaning and 
upper-class citizens should be less likely to blame the government to economic 
inequalities and distributive unfairness in society. In Argentina, class is the dominant 
social cleavage (Lupu and Stokes 2009).  Moreover, Argentina is relatively homogeneous 
country, and hence class cleavages are not as confounded by racial and ethnic divides as 
they are in the United States and Mexico.  Finally, public opinion about inequality is 
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much more polarized along class lines in Argentina than in the United States (Blofield 
and Luna 2011).   
 Mexico is another ideal setting to test my theory and hypotheses.  Mexico was a 
front-runner among Latin American governments trying to address poverty and inequality 
through conditional cash transfer programs, but Mexicans are very dissatisfied with the 
way democracy works in their country.  More than three-quarters of Mexican respondents 
in the 2014 AmericasBarometer (Figure 1.2) indicated some level of agreement that the 
government should enact firm policies to reduce inequality.  Thus, individuals in Mexico, 
just like individuals in Argentina, should be more likely than individuals in the US to 
blame the government for inequality.  Like the US, however, Mexico also presents an 
opportunity for another hard test of my theory and hypothesis, especially using 
experiments that rely on manipulating people perceptions of fairness.  First, class is not 
the dominant cleavage in Mexico, as it is often confounded with race and ethnicity.  
Furthermore, the baseline for political support is already low in Mexico. Democracy 
under 12 years of PAN leadership failed to deliver the economic promises Mexicans were 
hoping for and following a contested election in 2006 that left the country bitterly 
divided, drug-related violence spiked.   
In 2012, Mexico reinstalled the PRI to power, yet high hopes for change and 
reform under President Peña Nieto quickly faded: poverty and inequality are increasing 
and the government’s record regarding human rights, press freedom, and transparency is 
abysmal (Flores-Macías 2016).  Also, despite pledges to rein in corruption, the PRI 
government is at best unable to deliver, and most likely, the president’s inner circle is 
part of the problem (Flores-Macías 2016, 70).  In another instance of electoral volatility 
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common through the region, Mexican citizens elected the populist leftist leader Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador as president in 2018.  AMLO and his new MORENA party rose 
to power making a number of grand promises, such as combatting corruption and lifting 
Mexicans out of poverty, but it remains unlikely that this “mandate” will become a 
political reality.   
Given the generally poor quality of governance in Mexico (high corruption, 
arbitrary violence by state actors, lack of rule of law) it may be harder than in the US or 
Argentina to manipulate people’s perceptions of fairness in experiments—i.e., to make 
people believe that inequality is a fair distributive outcome.  As I elaborate in the next 
chapter, an implication of Fairness Heuristic Theory suggests people substitute judgments 
about governance quality and procedural justice for judgments about distributive fairness 
when deciding whether or not they can trust the authorities (van den Bos, Lind, and 
Wilke 2001; van den Bos, Wilke, and Lind 1998; Van Ryzin 2011).  Hence, people’s 
daily experiences with procedural injustice may outweigh any new information they 
encounter about distributive fairness.     
1.4  Overview of the Dissertation  
In Chapter 2, I develop my theoretical argument and lay out a series of four testable 
implications of this theory, or hypotheses.  First, I draw on a diverse body of research on 
psychology, social and procedural justice, and equity and fairness theories to argue that 
perceptions of distributive unfairness are key factors whereby economic inequality 
depresses support for the political system.  A testable implication of this theoretical 
argument is that at in a context of inequality, when individuals perceive their country’s 
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income distribution to be unfair, they should be less likely to trust the government or be 
satisfied with the way their country’s democracy functions.  I also argue in Chapter 2 that 
upper-class individuals, as well as those on the right of the political spectrum, should be 
less likely to express political dissatisfaction for any perceived distributive unfairness that 
they experience as a result of inequality.  Finally, I argue that governance quality in a 
country is vitally important for mitigating the negative influence of perceived distributive 
unfairness on support for the political system.  Although inequality challenges 
individuals’ normative expectations about the outcomes that democracy is supposed to 
produce, good governance provides citizens with alterative information that democracy is 
indeed functioning properly, thus allaying their political concerns about distributive 
injustice.   
 In Chapter 3, I use three waves of Latinobarometer survey data from 18 Latin 
American countries to test each of the four hypotheses that I developed in Chapter 2. As I 
explain in Chapter 3, Latinobarometer is ideal data for testing my theory because it 
regularly includes a question about citizens’ perceptions of the fairness of the income 
distribution, which is fundamentally distinct from citizens’ perceptions of trends in the 
income distribution.  I use a multilevel analysis of this survey data, which allows me to 
examine how both individual-level factors, specifically class status and political ideology, 
as well as country-level factors, such as aggregate inequality and governance quality, 
affect the relationship between perceptions of distributive unfairness and support for the 
political system. Consistent with a number of my hypotheses, I find that when controlling 
for actual levels of inequality, perceptions of distributive unfairness are negatively and 
significantly correlated with predicted satisfaction with democracy and trust in 
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government.  The cross-national analysis in Chapter 3 also shows that the negative 
relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and political support is weakest 
among right-leaning individuals, and that good governance mitigates this negative 
relationship as well. 
 In Chapter 4, I use original survey experiments in Argentina, Mexico, and the 
United States to isolate the causal effect of distributive fairness perceptions on political 
support.  The majority of the analysis in Chapter 4 centers around a large nationally 
representative online survey I conducted in February 2019 in Argentina.  I supplement 
this analysis with previous versions of this survey experiment that I fielded in Mexico on 
a student sample in 2018, and in 2017 in the United States using a convenience sample 
from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk platform.  Results from three different 
experiments, conducted over the course of two years in three different countries, are 
remarkably similar and consistent with my theoretical expectations.  Compared to 
individuals who receive no information about inequality, learning that economic 
inequality is increasing only erodes political support when framed as an unfair 
distributive outcome.  When given the opportunity to view inequality as a fair distributive 
outcome, however, support for the political system rebounds. 
 In Chapter 5, I use a second original survey experiment that I fielded in Argentina 
to investigate how governance quality – specifically, I manipulate information about the 
level of corruption – affects the manner in which economic inequality maps onto 
individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness, satisfaction with democracy, and trust 
in government.  Consistent with the theoretical expectations that I developed in Chapter 
2, I find that participants are significantly less likely to say that the income distribution in 
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Argentina is unfair when they learn that despite increases in inequality, governance 
quality is improving (compared to when it remains unchanged or gets worse).  Likewise, 
given the same information about increasing inequality, I find that individuals express 
higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in government when they read that 
governance quality is improving.    
 
 
CHAPTER 2. A THEORY OF FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE 
FACE OF INEQUALITY 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework that allows me to answer my 
main research questions: what are the specific conditions under which economic 
inequality undermines democratic legitimacy, and more specifically, how does inequality 
map onto individuals’ perceptions of fairness and subsequently affect satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in political institutions?  In order to develop my theoretical 
argument, I draw from a diverse body of literature on social and political psychology, as 
well as quality of governance, to derive new hypotheses about how people form their 
fairness judgments and use these judgments to evaluate democratic governments.   
I argue that at the individual level, political ideology and class status condition 
both the way that economic inequality maps onto perceptions of distributive unfairness 
and the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and political support.  To 
preview the argument, individuals on the political Right, as well as upper-class 
individuals, should be less upset with economic inequality in the first place. Moreover, 
even when these individuals perceive or experience distributive unfairness, they should 
be less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result.  At the contextual level, I 
argue that governance quality, or what some scholars have referred to as procedural 
fairness (e.g., Linde 2012), conditions the relationship between economic inequality, 
perceptions of distributive unfairness, and political support.  Although unfair distributive 
outcomes signal that democracy is not functioning properly, good governance, such as 
low corruption, impartiality in the exercise of public authority, and transparent 
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procedures that allow citizens to hold their elected officials accountable, provide 
alternative evidence that democracy is in fact functioning properly.  As such, the 
presence of these fair democratic processes and procedures should ally citizens’ concerns 
about inequality and distributive unfairness, at least when it comes to evaluating 
democratic legitimacy.   
2.2 The Sources of Democratic Legitimacy and Political Support  
Democratic consolidation depends of the legitimacy of democratic government 
and upon democracy becoming “the only game in town” for both masses and elites (Linz 
and Stephan 1996). In everyday language, we often think of legitimacy as the recognition 
that a political authority has the right to rule, or more generally as “citizen support for the 
government” (Booth and Seligson 2009, 8).  Easton (1975, 451) defines legitimacy as 
“the conviction that it is right and proper…to accept and obey the authorities and abide 
by the requirements of the regime” (451), and extant literature argues that legitimacy, or 
political support, is important for citizen acquiescence, especially with regard to policies 
and political outcomes that people disagree with (Cleary and Stokes 2006; Gibson, 
Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Tankebe 2013; Tyler 2004).   
Developments in the Americas during the last two decades suggest that political 
support, such as satisfaction with democracy or trust in representative institutions, is at 
troubling low levels. In Mexico, for instance, less than 20 percent of the people 
interviewed in the 2015 Latinobarometer survey indicated they were satisfied with the 
way democracy works in their country, and in Brazil, barely 22 percent of respondents 
were satisfied with democracy. This stands in stark contrast to countries such as Ecuador 
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or Uruguay, where citizens’ satisfaction with democracy ranges between 60 and 70 
percent. The low levels of political support that we observe across the region are of 
particular concern, as a number of countries in the Americas are experiencing or have 
previously experienced crises of representation (Mainwaring 2006), party system 
collapses (Morgan 2011; Tanaka 2006) and the rise of illiberal populist leaders (Mayorga 
2006).   
Scholars have grappled to understand why political support is at troubling low 
levels throughout the Americas.  The literature on political legitimacy posits a number of 
potential causes for widespread dissatisfaction with democracy and representation in 
some countries. One set of explanations focuses on political institutions and the 
representative outcomes they produce. Scholars have long argued that more consensual 
institutions lead to higher levels of satisfaction with democratic institutions (Lijphart 
1999). Citizens are generally less satisfied with democracy when they are consistently on 
the losing side of elections (Anderson et al. 2005; Conroy-Krutz and Kerr 2015), but the 
satisfaction gap between electoral winners and losers is smaller in consensual systems 
than in majoritarian ones (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cho and Bratton 2006). In 
addition to how people get into office, prior research also shows that who gets into office 
influences policymaking and citizens’ feelings about representation. Citizens are more 
likely to positively evaluate the political system when they see representatives who “look 
like them” (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004), and representatives from different 
groups bring different policy preferences to office (Barnes 2012; 2016). For instance, 
legislators from blue-collar backgrounds are more likely promote policies that benefit the 
working class, the majority of individuals in most countries, such as policies related to 
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labor and employment (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015). And, as a result, citizens 
are more satisfied with the representation they receive from political institutions when a 
greater number of legislators come from working-class backgrounds (Barnes and Saxton 
2019.). 
Another set of explanations for democratic legitimacy, such as political trust and 
satisfaction with the way democracy works in practice, focuses on citizens’ evaluations 
of government performance, and suggests that the favorability of economic outcomes is 
key to understanding political support (Booth and Seligson 2009; Dalton 2004; 
McAllister 1999). Moreover, while negative evaluations of economic performance are 
shown to haven a pernicious influence on political support in newer democracies, 
perceptions of corruption and “subjective feelings of being represented” have larger 
impacts on democratic satisfaction in more consolidated democracies (Dahlberg, Linde, 
and Holmberg 2015). Such findings further suggest that when evaluating the functioning 
of democratic governments, citizens care not only about political outputs, but about the 
fairness of democratic procedures as well. Indeed, poor governance quality – i.e., a lack 
of impartiality in the exercise of political authority (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) – is 
associated with decreased satisfaction with democracy, not only in Latin America (Weitz-
Shapiro 2008), but also in new and mature democracies more generally (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003; Kumlin and Esaisson 2012). For example, citizens are generally less 
satisfied with democracy when they live in countries with high corruption (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003), as effective rule of law is critical for widespread citizens satisfaction 
with authorities (Tyler 2003).   By contrast, individuals are more satisfied with the way 
their democracy functions when they perceive that elections guarantee the voices of all 
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voters are represented (Aarts and Thomassen 2008). Recent research even suggests that 
fair procedures attenuate the impact of government outputs on political dissatisfaction 
(Magalhães 2016). 
A growing body of research has also shown that economic inequality undermines 
a whole host of political support indicators, including support for and satisfaction with 
democracy, as well as trust in government. Using survey data from 20 European 
countries, Anderson and Singer (2008) show that citizens in countries with high levels of 
income inequality are, on average, less satisfied with democracy, and that this negative 
relationship is strongest among those on the political left, or what they call the “sensitive 
left.” More recently, Krieckhaus et al. (2014) examine World Value Survey data from 40 
democracies and find that income inequality depresses support for democracy. 
Krieckhaus et al. (2014, 150) explain that “citizens view economic inequality as a 
referendum on democracy,” and that support for democracy is determined in part by 
citizens’ evaluation of how inequality affects society as a whole. Zmerli & Castillo 
(2015) demonstrate that in Latin America, high levels of income inequality are associated 
with decreased trust in the national government. Furthermore, Córdova and Layton 
(2016) show that regardless of improvements to government performance in service 
provision, poor citizens in El Salvador are less likely to trust the municipal government 
when they live in neighborhoods with high levels of inequality. 
Extant research in this field has also suggested several causal mechanisms by 
which economic inequality undermines political support.  Given the well-documented 
connection between economic and political inequality in the United States (e.g. Bartels 
2008; Gilens 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010), it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
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concentration of wealth and income among a tiny percentage of the population would 
lead to disillusionment and disenchantment with democratic and representative 
institutions (Mainwaring 2006).  Research from American politics, for instance, suggests 
that economic inequality undermines political support by eroding citizens’ efficacy and 
attachments to representative institutions. High levels of economic inequality are shown 
to reduce participation in political campaigns (Ritter and Solt, forthcoming), voter turnout 
(Solt 2010), and political engagement more generally (Solt 2008). In other words, 
inequality undermines what scholars have called symbolic representation, or citizens’ 
feelings of being fairly and effectively represented (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Barnes 
and Saxton 2019; Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). 
Research on American politics during the last decade also has shown that policy 
outcomes across a range of issue areas reflect the preferences of the wealthiest citizens, 
preferences that are vastly different from those of low- and middle-income citizens 
(Gilens 2012).  And moreover, policy outcomes over the last few decades in the US are 
themselves contributing to increasing economic inequality (Bartels 2008; Hacker and 
Pierson 2010).  Thus, economic inequality violates the core democratic principle of one 
person, one vote, by giving a small group of wealthy citizens undue political influence.  
While the above research on inequality in the United States does not necessarily 
imply that people accurately perceive or experience economic inequality, much of the 
comparative political behavior research on inequality assumes, at least implicitly, that 
individuals are aware of the economic disparities that exist in society, and that they view 
inequality unfavorably.  For instance, Anderson and Singer (2008, 586) caveat their 
finding that economic inequality is associated with decreased satisfaction with democracy 
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by explaining: “these analyses assume that people experience inequality and perceive it 
accurately – an assumption that is open to interpretation.”  In investigating the 
relationship between inequality and support for democracy, Krieckhaus et al. (2014) also 
implicitly assume that individuals experience and accurately perceive inequality.  
Economic voting and political economy literatures have produced competing 
expectations about the relationship between inequality and support for democracy. 
Political economy theories assume that democracy will reduce inequality (e.g., Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2006; Meltzer and Richards 1981) and hence the vast majority of (poor) 
citizens will support democracy as a means to even out the income distribution.  
Krieckhaus et al. (2014) draw on economic voting literature to make an alternative 
argument – and offer empirical support – that citizens look unfavorably upon inequality, 
and when they experience high levels of inequality, their retrospective and sociotropic 
evaluations of them economy lead them to support democracy less. 
In these ways, objective levels of economic inequality certainly shape citizens’ 
political evaluations.  Yet, when it comes to political support, such as satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in government, I argue that citizens’ perceptions of the income 
distribution are equally important. Not only do individuals sometimes misunderstand 
(Kim, Pedersen, and Mutz 2016) and underestimate the true magnitude of income 
disparities, especially at high levels of inequality (Osberg and Smeeding 2006), but they 
also tend to legitimize income differences (Trump 2018) and become less supportive of 
redistributive policies (Kelly and Enns 2010) as objective levels of inequality increase. 
Indeed, in Latin America, objective levels of inequality and citizens’ perceptions of the 
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fairness of the income distribution are only moderately correlated.2  Below, I advance 
these scholarly lines of research by examining how economic inequality maps onto 
people’s perceptions of distributive fairness and subsequent political evaluations, and 
how these relationships are conditioned by political ideology and class at the individual-
level, as well as by contextual factors such as governance quality and the fairness of 
democratic procedures more generally. 
2.3 Economic Inequality, Distributive Fairness, and Political Support 
Inequality challenges a fundamental human motivation—people’s desire to live in 
a just world (Kay and Jost 2003; Lerner and Miller 1978). Classic models of inequality 
and democratization assume that under democracy the poor will demand wealth 
redistribution, thus decreasing economic inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; 
Meltzer and Richard 1981).  An implication of this “conventional wisdom” is that certain 
groups of people (i.e., the poor) dislike inequality, and they dislike it as a matter of 
resource attribution: resources are finite, economic resources are concentrated in the 
hands of the rich, and the poor want a larger share of these economic resources.  Yet, 
psychological research on social justice suggests that all citizens—rich and poor alike—
should dislike economic disparities, albeit for different reasons.  
Drawing on equity theories that date back to Aristotle, this research suggests that 
people care deeply about proportionality, that is, whether the outcomes that people 
                                                 
2 This figure is from the 2009-2015 Latinobarometer.  The correlation (r=.44) represents 
the relationship between objective inequality (Gini coefficient) and the average response 
to the question “How fair is the income distribution in [country]?” in each country-year 
of the survey (high values indicate more perceived unfairness).  
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receive (income and other resources) are proportional to their inputs (e.g., time and 
effort) (Jost and Kay 2010).  For instance, if a CEO is paid 300 times the salary of an 
average worker for what is perceived to be the same amount of time and effort, this 
outcome violates the distributive justice concept of desert, or deservingness (Miller 
1999).  Although this disproportionate outcome clearly disadvantages the worker, leaving 
her to feel angry or resentful, the CEO should feel guilty about being over-benefitted and 
should seek to restore equity (Waksalk et al. 2007).3 
This is not to suggest that individuals want a perfectly egalitarian society.  Indeed, 
the whole idea of class mobility implies that a certain amount of inequality in society is 
acceptable.  It is not inequality, per se, that upsets people, but the unfairness of a system 
that disproportionately benefits the wealthy at the expense of everyone else. Drawing on 
Rawls, Jost and Kay (2010, 1129) explain, “Some degree of inequality in society is 
tolerable, but only to the extent that it benefits those who are relatively disadvantaged, for 
example by creating wealth so that everyone truly benefits.”  There is no question that 
inequality is objectively high in the Americas, yet I argue that what matters for 
satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions is the extent to which 
citizens perceive the economic distribution in their country as fair or unfair. When people 
encounter information that challenges their desire to believe they live in a just world, they 
experience negative and uncomfortable cognitive reactions, and they often look for an 
individual or group – such as the government – to blame (Gurr 1986; Kay and Jost 2003; 
                                                 
3 Indeed, in Latin America, perceptions of distributive unfairness are remarkably similar 
across wealth quintiles (Latinobarometer 2009-2015), and wealth quintile is not a 
significant predictor of perceived distributive unfairness in multivariate models.  
Additionally, the correlation between respondents’ perceptions of distributive unfairness 
and class self-placement are extremely weak (r=.10). 
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Lerner and Miller 1978). In particular, when citizens perceive inequality as an unfair 
outcome resulting from the inaction of democratic governments, their political 
satisfaction is likely to suffer. In other words, perceptions of distributive unfairness are 
important factors linking inequality to political support. Given this I posit: 
Hypothesis 1: On average, citizens who perceive the distribution of income in 
their country as unfair will express lower levels of political support than 
individuals who view the income distribution as fair.   
2.4 The Conditioning Effects of Class Status Political Ideology  
Although social justice theories predict that everyone should dislike inequality, for 
reasons related to the desire for proportionality and equity, not everyone will respond to 
inequality in the same manner.  In this section, I develop a theoretical argument, as well 
as testable hypotheses from this theory, about how two important individual-level factors, 
class status and political ideology, condition the relationship between economic 
inequality, perceptions of distributive unfairness, and support for the political system.  To 
preview the main argument in this section, I posit that upper-class individuals, as well as 
those on the right of the political spectrum (or conservatives in the US context) should be 
less upset by economic inequality in the first place.  But, if and when these individuals 
perceive distributive unfairness when they witness or experience economic inequality, 
they should be less likely to experience political dissatisfaction as a result.  To develop 
these arguments, I rely primarily on deductive reasoning and draw on literature from 
system justification theory, the moral foundations of political ideology, and left-right 
semantics. 
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2.4.1 Class Status 
In the previous section, I argued that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key 
to explaining prior findings that inequality damages political support. Yet, perceptions of 
fairness and political support should vary by class status as well. For instance, more well-
off individuals may witness the same levels of inequality as lower-class individuals, but 
because they do not experience the negative side of inequality, they should be less likely 
to perceive it as unfair.  In the 2015 Latinobarometer, for instance, upper-class 
individuals were significantly more likely that lower-class individuals to say the income 
distribution in their country was either “fair” or “very fair” (p<.01). Yet even if and when 
upper-class individuals view inequality as problematic, they may nonetheless believe that 
is not the government’s responsibility to correct for a skewed economic distribution.  
Social justice research and equity theories argue that individuals rely on a variety 
of coping mechanisms for dealing with the distress that comes from experiencing 
inequality and subsequently distributive injustice. In particular, individuals can either 
respond to inequality behaviorally or cognitively (Jost and Kay 2010). That is, they could 
try to do something about inequality, such as protesting or seeking restorative justice, or 
they could try to rationalize inequality by denying or minimizing it (Jost et al. 2003). 
Cognitive reactions often manifest themselves in victim blaming (Hafer et al. 2005) or 
adopting legitimizing stereotypes that justify group differences (Cassese and Holman 
2017; Kay and Jost 2003; Tyler 2006). 
  In his 2012 book, Martin Gilens shows that wealthy individuals in the United 
States use their disproportionate affluence and influence to secure more conservative 
economic policies, such as relaxed corporate regulation and more regressive tax policies.  
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At the same time, in order to adjust psychologically to inequality, as social justice 
research suggests all individuals do (Jost and Kay 2010), members of high-status groups 
like the upper class often rely on legitimizing myths about deservingness or meritocracy 
to understand inequality (Jost and Hunyady 2003), or on trait stereotypes that advantaged 
groups are more “competent” (Fiske et al. 2002). According to individuals drawing on 
such legitimizing myths, if inequality exists, blame rests with those disadvantaged by 
inequality for not working hard enough to overcome their economic situation. All this 
suggests that given the same context of objective inequality, upper-class individuals will 
be less likely to perceive inequality as unfair in the first place.   
Yet, just because upper-class individuals are less likely than lower-class 
individuals to view inequality as problematic, this is not to say that the poor uniformly 
dislike inequality and the wealthy like it.  Recall that in Latin America, upper-class 
individuals were significantly more likely (by about 10 percent) than lower-class 
individuals to say the income distribution in their country was either “fair” or “very fair.”  
Still, the vast majority of upper-class respondents, about 68 percent in 2015, still 
indicated that their country’s income distribution was either “unfair” or “very unfair.” 
But because upper-class individuals tend to have more pro-market views regarding the 
state’s role in the economy (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Gilens 2012), they 
should be less likely to express political dissatisfaction for any perceived distributive 
unfairness that they experience as a result of inequality. Hence, I posit the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness 
and political support should be weakest among upper class citizens.  
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2.4.2 Political Ideology 
As with class status, I also argue that political ideology will condition that way 
that inequality maps onto people’s perceptions of distributive fairness and subsequent 
political evaluations. Specifically, people on the right of the political spectrum (also 
referred to conservatives, especially in the US context) should be less distressed by 
economic inequality in the first place, but if and when they perceive distributive 
unfairness, they should be less likely to express dissatisfaction with the political system 
as a result.  To develop this argument and corresponding hypothesis, I return to the 
literature on system justification, and I also incorporate insights from research on the 
moral foundations of political ideology and left-right semantics.   
 Anderson and Singer’s (2008) seminal finding that high levels of income 
inequality are associated with low levels of satisfaction with democracy is mainly driven 
by individuals on the left of the political spectrum.  This finding comports well with 
research on the moral foundations of political ideology, which suggests that left-leaning 
individuals are more likely to be upset with inequality and to view disproportionate 
economic outcomes as unfair, for reasons related to deep-seated cognitive processes. In 
particular, this research demonstrates that those on the left are more likely to moralize 
outcomes they perceive as unfair or harmful to others, whereas those on the right are 
more likely to moralize threats to order, authority, or the status quo (Graham et al 2009; 
2012). Extending this logic, leftist citizens should be most distressed by high levels of 
economic inequality that have disproportionately negative impacts on the poor, and they 
should be more likely than right-leaning citizens to blame the government for an 
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economic distribution that is continually concentrated in the hands of a small group of 
wealthy citizens.  
The above research suggests that those on the political right should be less 
concerned than those on the left with economic inequality in the first place, yet even 
when right-leaning individuals can acknowledge distributive unfairness, they should still 
be less likely than left-leaning individuals to express political dissatisfaction as a result.4 
The propensity of those on the political right to moralize threats to order and authority 
(Graham et al 2009; 2012) should make them less likely to criticize the political status 
quo when looking for someone to blame. Moreover, given that political conservatism is 
itself a system-legitimizing ideology, with conservatives being more likely to stereotype 
and express hostility toward low-status out groups (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and 
Napier 2009), those on the right of the political spectrum should rely on some of the same 
system justifying narratives as upper-class individuals (described in the previous section) 
to justify group differences. 
Much of the literature on political conservatism as a system justifying ideology 
(e.g., Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) is based on research from the 
United States, where distinct liberal and conservative political ideologies map onto the 
left-right political spectrum more cleanly than in Latin America.  For instance, recent 
                                                 
4 Even though individuals on the right of the political spectrum should be less likely than 
those on the left to moralize and/or be upset by economic inequality, plenty of right-
leaning individuals in both the US and Latin America view the status quo economic 
distribution as problematic.  In the 2015 Latinobarometer, for instance, nearly three-
quarters of all right-leaning respondents indicated that their country’s income distribution 
was either “unfair” or “very unfair.”  In the 2017 MTurk study described above, about 51 
percent of conservative participants indicated that the income distribution in the U.S. is 
“unfair” or “very unfair.” 
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research on the 2016 U.S. presidential election has shown that that two key system 
justifying ideologies, hostile sexism and racial resentment, were significant predictors of 
voting for the Republican candidate (Cassese and Barnes 2018; Schaffner, MacWilliams, 
and Nteta 2018).  Meanwhile, scholars have debated how well these ideological labels 
transport to Latin America (Zechmeister 2006).  To ensure that the conceptual 
components of the arguments in this section actually travel from the United States to 
Latin America, I briefly turn to survey data to examine whether system-justifying 
attitudes correlate with left-right placement as they do in the United States.  
The World Values Survey regularly measures a variety of system-justifying 
attitudes related to inequality and the economy.  I examine five attitudes in particular: 
1) “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts 
2) “People (as opposed to the government) should take more responsibility to 
provide for themselves.” 
3) “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new 
ideas.” 
4) “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life.” 
5) “Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone” (as opposed to “people 
only get rich at the expense of others”). 
I first used principal components factor analysis to investigate how well these 
system-justifying attitudes scale together.  Factor analysis reveals that the first two 
questions correlate with one underlying factor, while the last three questions correlate 
with a second underlying factor.  I then used multivariate regression to investigate how 
well these different system-justifying attitudes predict left-right ideological placement in 
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the seven Latin American countries included in Wave 6 of the WVS (see Appendix Table 
A1 for OLS models with full controls and country-fixed effects).  The questions about 
income differences, personal responsibility, and there being enough wealth for everyone 
are all significant (p<.001) predictors of rightist ideological placement.  Saying that hard 
work pays off predicts right-wing placement at p=.09, meanwhile attitudes about 
competition being good are not associated with left-right placement in Latin America.  Of 
particular interest here, the best predictor of right-wing placement is agreement that “we 
need larger income differences.”  In substantive terms, moving from 1 (“incomes should 
be made more equal”) to 10 (“we need larger income differences as incentives for 
individual effort) is associated with a change in expected political ideology from 5.10 to 
6.14 (on a 1 to 10 left-right scale).  This statistically significant difference represents a 
full scale-point move toward the right.  These results are also robust to indexing the 
questions about income differences and personal responsibility, which both correlate with 
a common underlying factor.  A move from the least to most system-justifying attitudes 
is associated with a 1.3-point move to the right on the 1-10 left-right ideological scale.   
In sum, political psychology research suggests that those on the left should be 
more upset with inequality in the first place, and more likely to moralize and perceive it 
as unfair, compared to those on the right. Yet, even when those on the right acknowledge 
that economic inequality represents a form of distributive unfairness, they should still be 
less likely than individuals on the left to express political dissatisfaction as a result. For 
right-leaning individuals, criticizing the government for unfair distributive outcomes 
poses a threat to the political and economic status quo. Moreover, when “cognitively 
adjusting” to inequality, those on the right should be more likely than those on the left to 
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blame the poor for perceived distributive injustice, than express dissatisfaction with the 
political system. Thus, I posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness 
and political support should be weakest among right-leaning citizens. 
2.5 Inequality, Fairness Perceptions, and Governance Quality 
The above theory and hypothesis posit that citizens’ evaluations of distributive 
outcomes shape their support for the political system.  Yet, the context in which people 
form their perceptions of economic inequality and distributive fairness matters for their 
political evaluations as well.  Specifically, insights from social psychology suggest that 
governance quality – i.e., impartiality in the exercise of political authority (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008) – affects how citizens form judgments about inequality and distributive 
fairness and use these judgments to subsequently evaluate democratic governments.   
People care deeply about the procedures by which political outcomes are 
produced (André and Depauw 2017; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001). In particular, 
good governance, which some scholars have also referred to as procedural fairness 
(Linde 2012), should diminish the extent to which distributive unfairness erodes political 
support, even in the face of economic inequality. An implication of research on the Fair 
Process Effect (e.g., Tyler and van der Toorn 2013; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, and 
Vermunt 1998) is that governance quality shapes people’s expectations about the 
outcomes they receive and their responses to any distributive unfairness they may 
experience. People desire fair procedures because they are perceived to produce fair 
outcomes (Thibaut and Walker 1975), and people are generally more satisfied with 
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outcomes—unfavorable or otherwise—when they are the result of fair and transparent 
processes (van den Bos 2005).  
Individuals often draw on multiple sources of information when forming their 
judgments about fairness and democracy (André and Depauw 2017), and Fairness 
Heuristic Theory (FTH) further suggests that governance quality is especially important 
when people lack the information they need to make accurate social comparisons.  People 
often underestimate the true magnitude of income disparities at high levels of inequality 
(Osberg and Smeeding 2006), and low status individuals tend to inflate their own position 
in the income distribution (Aalberg 2003). If and when such accurate social comparisons 
are lacking, FTH suggests that people use information about processes and procedures – 
such as the quality of governance – to help form perceptions of distributive fairness, and 
consequently evaluations of political support (Córdova and Layton 2016; Magalhães 
2016; Van Ryzin 2011).    
One important indicator of governance quality is corruption, which conveys 
important messages to citizens about the fairness of government policies and processes. 
Corruption on the part of government officials violates “the belief that the authority 
makes genuine attempts at being fair and ethical” (Magalhães 2016, 525; Tyler and Lind 
1992).  It sends a signal that certain people are above the law, and that all citizens are not 
treated equally (Linde 2012, 413).5 In addition to affecting citizens’ judgments about 
                                                 
5 Although there is good reason to expect that corruption or poor governance is an 
underlying cause of economic inequality (e.g., Uslaner 2008), the correlation between 
inequality (Gini coefficient) and corruption (World Bank’s WGI control of corruption 
measure) is virtually non-existent in Latin America (r=.002) during the period under 
investigation. Moreover, the correlation between inequality and other governance 
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fairness, corruption also impedes governance capacity (Graycar and Villa 2011), hinders 
women’s political advancement (Stockemer and Sundström 2018; Sundström and 
Wängnerud 2016), and undermines electoral accountability and democratic legitimacy 
more generally (Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008; Bauhr and Charron 2018; Booth and 
Seligson 2009; Kumlin and Esaisson 2012; Linde and Erlingsson 2013).  
Corruption is salient and pervasive in a number of Latin American countries, at all 
levels of government.  In the 2015 Latinobarometer, nearly 20 percent of all respondents 
indicated that they or a family member had personally witnessed an act of corruption or 
bribe taking by a politician or government official in the last year.  Themes about 
corruption, inequality, and support for the political system are also evident in elite and 
media discourse in Latin America.  An article in Clarín, a national newspaper in 
Argentina, reported in 2018: “It would seem that a kind of vicious circle has been 
generated between corruption, the unequal distribution of power in society and inequality 
in the distribution of wealth.  Corruption is destroying the fabric of society and the 
confidence of the population in the political system and its leaders.”6   
Corruption can take many forms, including bribery and outright theft, and its 
scope ranges from petty corruption, generally on the part of low-level civil servants, to 
grand corruption orchestrated by high-level public officials (Bauhr 2017; Graycar and 
Villa 2011).  In a context of high poverty and inequality, there is good reason to expect 
that governance indicators such as corruption shape citizens’ judgments about distributive 
                                                 
indicators, such as WGI’s government effectiveness (r=.16) or rule of law (r=14) 
measures is equally weak. 
6 https://www.clarin.com/economia/corrupcion-desigual-distribucion-
riqueza_0_B1N55Roqz.html 
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fairness and their subsequent evaluations of the political system.  Corruption-as-theft 
reduces the overall level of public resources that are necessary to successfully enact pro-
egalitarian social welfare programs (Desierto 2019).  And, although corruption-as-bribery 
does not diminish the total amount of public goods available for redistribution, it 
challenges societal norms about equality of economic opportunity (Rothstein and Uslaner 
2005).  
Although corruption is an important indicator of governance quality, or what 
some scholars have referred to as procedural fairness (e.g., Linde 2012), we can also 
think about governance quality in terms of electoral accountability or fair and transparent 
government decision-making procedures that give voice to a variety of groups and 
interests.  People desire fair procedures because they are perceived to produce fair 
outcomes (Thibaut and Walker 1975). Much of the research on procedural and 
distributive fairness from psychology, for instance, demonstrates that that people are 
generally more satisfied with processes and outcomes – whether objectively favorable or 
unfavorable – when they are given a say in the decision-making process (e.g., van den 
Bos 2005). Research on descriptive representation of racial minorities in the U.S. finds 
that even when committees make decisions that go against minority interests, individuals 
– blacks and whites alike – are more likely to view the decision-making process as fair. 
Clayton, O’Brien, and Piscopo (2019) find that gender parity in decision-making bodies 
increases both the committee’s substantive and procedural legitimacy.  Specifically, they 
find that when a gender-balanced panel makes a decision that restricts women’s rights, 
people are more likely to view both the decision-making process, as well as the outcome 
itself, as more legitimate.   
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Following the above logic, in a context of good governance, citizens should react 
less unfavorably to social and economic inequalities in the first place.  Yet, even when 
citizens perceive or experience distributive unfairness, the presence of good governance, 
such as the impartial exercise of public power (Linde 2012; Rothstein and Teorell 2008) 
should make them less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result.  Thus, I posit 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The negative relationship between perceptions of distributive 
unfairness and political support will be weakest in a context of good governance.    
Table 2.1 Summary of Hypotheses 
Inequality and 
Distributive Unfairness 
(average effects) 
H1: On average, citizens who perceive the distribution of 
income in their country as unfair will express lower levels 
of political support than individuals who view the income 
distribution as fair. 
Conditioning Effect of 
Class-Status 
H2: The negative relationship between perceived 
distributive unfairness and political support will be weakest 
among upper-class individuals. 
Conditioning Effect of 
Political Ideology 
H3: The negative relationship between perceived 
distributive unfairness and political support will be weakest 
among right-leaning individuals. 
Conditioning Effect of 
Governance Quality  
H4: Good governance will weaken the negative relationship 
between perceived distributive unfairness and political 
support.  
 
In this chapter, I have developed a series of arguments about the relationship 
between economic inequality, perceptions of distributive unfairness, and support for the 
political system.  To recap, I argue that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key 
factors by which economic inequality undermines trust in government and satisfaction 
with democracy.  I further argue that individuals’ class status and political ideology, as 
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well as a country’s governance quality, all condition this relationship in important ways.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the hypotheses I derived from each part of my theoretical 
framework.  In the next chapters, I use cross-national survey data, as well as original 
survey experiments to empirically test the implications of the arguments I developed in 
this chapter. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3. INEQUALITY, FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT: A CROSS-
NATIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
“The state gets money to invest in society, such as social development, education, public 
works, and health.  This is the main activity that the state should do, but if the distribution 
is not progressive and in favor of all society, there will be consequences for inequality.” 
-Argentine Legislative advisor, UCR, 2018 
 
In Chapter 2, I developed a theoretical argument that individuals’ perceptions of 
distributive (un)fairness are key factors whereby inequalities in society translate into 
political dissatisfaction.  Research on social justice and equity theories suggest that all 
individuals should be distressed by high levels of inequality, but just because individuals 
dislike inequality, it does not necessarily follow that they will blame the government for 
it.  After all, inequality in the modern era is a natural product of capitalism and the free 
market, and class mobility depends in part on there being at least some degree of 
economic inequality in society (Jost and Kay 2010). Nevertheless, original qualitative 
survey data that I collected in the United States suggests that even though people may see 
inequality as resulting from the economic rather than the political system, many still think 
government could or should do something to address it. 7 When asked about the causes of 
economic inequality in the United States, a number of survey respondents indicated 
sentiments similar to the following: 
                                                 
7 In March 2017, I administered a survey with embedded experimental manipulations 
and open-ended survey questions on Amazon’s MTurk platform.  Although MTurk uses 
convivence samples, prior research has shown them to be more representative than 
traditional convenience sample – e.g., student samples (Buhrmester et al. 2011), MTurk 
samples have also been used to replicate existing political science studies remarkably 
well (Berinsky et al. 2012).  
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“One word…government.” 
“The minimum wage is too low which generates a very low household income 
that the family has barely enough to support the family with the increasing cost of 
living, healthcare, and property.  
 
“I think it’s mostly government policies that favor the rich. Also, middle class 
people don’t receive any help.” 
 
“Market deregulation has ‘unreformed’ practices that have a history of creating 
bad behavior.” 
 
Without prompting, people draw connections between factors such as government 
controls, the minimum wage, deregulation, or tax policies and economic inequality. 
Taken together, these excerpts suggest that people understand how government could 
implement policies that reduce inequality, and they recognize that the government is not 
doing as much as it could to alleviate the problem.  
There is also ample evidence from Latin America to suggest that individuals draw 
strong connections between government in(action) and economic inequalities in society.  
In Argentina, for instance, the vast majority of citizens believe the government should 
redistribute wealth to reduce economic inequality (Lupu, 2016). Elsewhere in Latin 
America, anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of citizens indicate that the government 
“should enact firm policies to reduce inequality” (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 
2012).  
Similar themes about government (in)action and inequality in Latin America also 
appear in elite discourse.  Consider, for example, the excerpt at the opening of this 
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chapter. In Summer 2018, I conducted several interviews on a convenience sample of 
political elites in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  When asked about the causes and 
consequences of economic inequality in Argentina, a former advisor to the Buenos Aires 
City Legislature and party official in the Radical Civic Union (UCR) explained,  
“The state gets money to invest in society, such as social development, education, 
public works, and health.  This is the main activity that the state should do, but if 
the distribution is not progressive and in favor of all society, there will be 
consequences for inequality.”8   
 
She went on to explain that the previous government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
“did a lot for the distribution between rich and poor people.” In comparison to the current 
government of Mauricio Macri, Kirchner’s government did much more for a “fair 
distribution of wealth between rich and poor people,” but at the present time, inequality 
has returned “because poor people are not being promoted in politics.”  These examples 
do not suggest that individuals want a perfectly egalitarian economic distribution.  
Rather, they are distressed by a skewed income distribution because they perceive it to be 
an unfair outcome resulting from government policies that disproportionately benefit one 
small group of citizens at the expense of the rest.    
3.1 Fairness Perceptions and Political Support in Latin America 
In this first empirical chapter, I use public opinion data from 18 Latin American 
countries from 2011 to 2015 as a first test all of the hypotheses I developed in Chapter 2.  
In many ways, Latin America is an ideal case for testing hypotheses related to 
                                                 
8 Author interview, June 2018. 
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individuals’ perceptions of the income distribution and support for the political system.  
First, while Latin America as a region has the highest levels of economic inequality in the 
world (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010), there is significant variation in the level of 
inequality between countries.  In the period under investigation, the Gini coefficient for 
net income inequality (Solt 2016) ranges from a low of 36.5 in Venezuela to a high of 
52.17 in Honduras.9  The left panel Figure 3.1 illustrates this trend using the most 
recently available inequality figures, sorted from highest to lowest income inequality.  
The right panel in Figure 3.1 is a scatterplot showing the correlation between aggregate 
levels of inequality and the mean response to the question “how fair is the income 
distribution in your country” for each Latinobarometer country-year in my cross-national 
sample (1=very fair to 4=very unfair), as well as the corresponding regression line.  
Although the slope of the regression line in Figure 3.1 is statistically significant, the 
aggregate correlation between inequality and perceptions of distributive unfairness is 
moderate (r=.51), indicating the actual inequality only explains part of the variance in 
individuals’ judgments about the fairness of the income distribution.   
Prior empirical research has demonstrated a robust correlation between high 
levels of income inequality and low levels of a host of political support indicators, from 
support for democracy (Krieckhaus et al. 2014) to satisfaction with democracy (Anderson 
and Singer 2008) and trust in government (Córdova and Layton 2016; Zmerli and 
Castillo 2015).  Indeed, the patterns in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 are generally consistent with 
                                                 
9 The Gini coefficient for net income inequality is a measure of inequality accounting for 
income after taxes and transfers.  Theoretically this measure goes from 0, representing 
perfect equality (all people have the same income), to 100, representing perfect inequality 
(one person has all the income in a country). 
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these findings.  Countries with low levels of income inequality by Latin American 
standards, such as Uruguay and Argentina, have comparatively higher levels of 
satisfaction with democracy and trust in government (see Figure 3.2).  A key part of my 
argument, however, is that individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness, which are 
only moderately correlated with actual levels of inequality are other important predictors 
of political support.   
Figure 3.1 Inequality and Fairness Perceptions in Latin America 
 
Note: The left panel shows the Gini coefficient for net income inequality (Solt 2016) for each 
Latin American country in the sample.  The right panel shows the aggregate-level correlation 
between income inequality and each country’s average amount of perceived distributive 
unfairness along with the corresponding regression line.  
 
The fact that actual inequality is an imperfect predictor of individuals’ fairness 
perceptions is fully consistent with qualitative data that I collected in the U.S. and 
Argentina, as well as with my theoretical argument that certain groups of people – i.e., 
upper-class (H2) and right-leaning (H3) citizens – are more likely to legitimize income 
differences.  Consider this response to a question about the causes of economic inequality 
in the U.S.:  
“There is always going to be income inequality in a capitalist system. Education 
and training are big contributors… I worked hard for my degree to get a decent 
42 
 
job with opportunities…People should make more effort to equalize their incomes 
on their own.”  
 
Here, there is an acknowledgment that inequality exists, but this respondent also places 
the responsibility for addressing inequality on those individuals disadvantaged by the 
inequality, rather than the government. According to this view, inequality is natural, and 
it is fair.  
Qualitative survey evidence shows that US respondents frequently engage in such 
system-justifying legitimation.  When asked about the causes of economic inequality in 
the U.S., a common reply is that people are “lazy,” or,  
“The rich stay rich because those people are smart and look for ways to maintain 
being rich. The poor look for ways to receive more handouts from the government 
and don't look to find ways to improve their situation like the rich do.”  
 
“I think part of the problem is some people simply don’t want to work hard to get 
ahead.  Too many people rely on the government for help.” 
 
“Some people simply work harder at earning a living than others do, some people 
would rather be lazy and rely on assistance.” 
 
Again, similar sentiments appear outside the United States too.  When discussing the 
topic of inequality in Argentina, a legislative aid to a national Deputy mentioned that 
poverty and inequality are “structural problems” in Argentina, in that they are self-
reinforcing.  This aid then elaborated that many poor people in Argentina suffer from a 
poor work ethic:  
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“I believe that we don’t have an employment culture, a culture related to work.  
People who can get a job aren’t interested in working because the state will give 
you lots of things like housing and food.”   
 
Certain individuals may be well aware of the inequalities that exist in society, but 
nevertheless still have a material self-interest in maintaining the economic status quo, no 
matter how skewed it may be. 
For the abovementioned reasons, the empirical focus in this chapter is on 
individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness, which I account for while also 
controlling for actual levels of inequality at the country-level.  Figure 3.2 demonstrates 
that there is substantial variation not only in perceptions of distributive unfairness, but 
also in satisfaction with democracy and trust in government across these 18 Latin 
American countries.  Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of respondents indicating that they 
perceive their country’s income distribution as unfair, are satisfied with democracy, and 
trust the government.  Each of these questions from Latinobarometer are coded on a 1 to 
4 scale. The percentages displayed in Figure 3.2 reflect individuals selecting either of the 
top two response outcomes. 
Figure 3.2 Distribution of Key Measures Across Latin America 
 
 
Variation in these key measures is vital for testing my hypothesis that individuals 
will be less likely to support the political system when they perceive their country’s 
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income distribution to be unfair. As Figure 3.2 illustrates, satisfaction with democracy 
ranges from a low of less than 20 percent indicating “satisfied” or “very satisfied” in 
Mexico to a high of more than 70 percent in Uruguay.  Likewise, citizens in Mexico, 
Peru, El Salvador, and Brazil exhibit troubling low levels of trust in government – around 
20 percent indicating that they trust the government “some” or “a lot” – compared to 
citizens in countries such as Uruguay or the Dominican Republic.  Democratic 
legitimacy, as indicated in measures such as trust in government and satisfaction with 
democracy, are vital for democratic stability (Cleary and Stokes 2006), and the low levels 
of political support observed in a number of countries raise important questions about the 
state of democratic consolidation in the region. The results in Figure 3.2 appear 
consistent with my hypothesis that perceptions of distributive unfairness are associated 
with lower levels of political support.  In countries such as Brazil and Colombia, the 
overwhelming majority of citizens, more than 90 percent, indicate that they perceive their 
country’s income distribution to be “unfair” or “very unfair.”  These same countries also 
have some of the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in government in 
the region.  To fully test the hypotheses that I developed in Chapter 2, I turn to a 
multilevel analysis of Latinobarometer survey data.    
3.2 Methods and Data 
Despite the general patterns discussed above, prior research has documented a 
number of other individual-level and contextual predictors of political support like 
satisfaction with democracy, from the nature of a country’s electoral system (Anderson 
and Guillory 1997), to economic performance and citizens’ evaluations of the national 
economy (Booth and Seligson 2009; Dalton 2004; McAllister 1999), corruption 
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(Anderson and Tverdova), and support for the incumbent government (Anderson et al. 
2005).  To simultaneously account for a variety of predictors of political support, I turn to 
a multivariate, multilevel analysis of Latinobarometer survey data.  I use three waves of 
data from 2011 to 2015, covering 18 Latin American countries, and I estimate a series of 
multilevel ordered logit models in Stata 15 to examine the relationship between 
individuals’ fairness judgments and two measures of political support: satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in government.  For each dependent variable, I first estimate a series 
of baseline models to test Hypothesis 1 about the direct effect relationship between 
fairness perceptions and political support.  I then estimate a series of models with 
individual-level and cross-level interactions to test Hypotheses 2 through 4.   
 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
My primary objective in this first empirical chapter is to investigate the 
relationship between perceptions of distributive unfairness and support for the political 
system. The empirical chapters in this dissertation employ two specific indicators of 
political support: satisfaction with democracy and trust in government.  Neither of these 
measures are what Easton (1975) would refer to as “diffuse” measures of political 
support, yet they are stable enough to resist the short-term fluctuations of “specific” 
support that political authorities tend to face (Dalton, 2004; Hetherington 1998).  
Prior research theorizes that political support is itself a multidimensional concept.  
Much of the contemporary work on political support builds upon Easton’s (1975) 
distinction between specific and diffuse forms of political support.  Easton explains that 
specific support is directed toward specific political institutions and authorities, whereas 
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diffuse support is directed toward the ideas that these political authorities and intuitions 
represent.  More recently, scholars have reimagined Easton’s conceptualization of 
political support not as a dichotomy, but as a continuum that runs from specific to diffuse 
forms of support.  Norris (1999; 2011) describes five objects of political support: political 
actors (most specific), regime institutions, regime performance, regime principles, and 
the political community (most diffuse).  Booth and Seligson (2009) identify a sixth object 
of political support: local government.  Although diffuse support for democratic norms is 
vital for democratic stability and consolidation, more specific forms of support are also 
important, as a prolonged period of democratic dissatisfaction or declining trust may have 
serious consequences for the stability and consolidation of democracies in the region.       
Satisfaction with Democracy: Satisfaction with democracy represents an 
important dimension of state legitimacy (Norris 2011) that taps the level of support “for 
how the democratic regime works in practice” (Linde and Eckman 2003). To measure 
satisfaction with democracy, Latinobarometer asks respondents, “In general, would you 
say that you are very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied 
with the working of democracy in your country?”  Responses in the analysis are coded 
such that “very dissatisfied” (coded 1); “dissatisfied” (2); “satisfied” (3); and “very 
satisfied” (4).  As Figure 3.3 illustrates, the modal response to this question is 
“dissatisfied”, with 42 percent of all respondents in the pooled sample selecting this 
response outcome.   
Trust in Government: Citizens need to trust their political institutions in order for 
democracy to function properly (Cleary and Stokes 2006; Hetherington 1998).  
Institutional trust is particularly important for citizens’ acquiescence, especially regarding 
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policies and political outcomes that people disagree with (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
2005; Tankebe 2013).  As with democratic satisfaction, however, trust in government is 
at troubling low levels in a number of Latin American countries.  To measure trust in 
government, Latinobarometer asks respondents, “How much trust do you have in the 
national government?  Would you say you have a lot (coded 1), some (2) a little (3), or no 
trust (4)?”  For the analysis, responses to this question are recoded such that higher values 
indicate more trust.  As Figure 3.3 illustrates, the modal response to this question in the 
pooled sample is “a little” (33 percent of respondents) followed closely by “not at all” (28 
percent of respondents).  
Figure 3.3 Distribution of Fairness Perceptions and Political Support, Pooled Sample 
 
Note:  Responses are pooled across all country-years in the 2011-2015 Latinobarometer waves. 
 
3.2.2 Independent Variables  
Perceptions of Distributive Unfairness The primary individual-level predictor of 
satisfaction with democracy and trust in government, perceptions of distributive 
unfairness, is based on the Latinobarometer question, “How fair do you think the income 
distribution is in your country?”  This survey item is ideal for the research at hand: it 
maps onto the core theoretical concept—i.e., fairness perceptions, as opposed to 
assessments or evaluations of actual inequality—remarkably well.  Cross-national public 
opinion surveys frequently ask respondents whether they think the gap between the rich 
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and poor is getting bigger or smaller, but just because individuals perceive inequality to 
be on the rise, they will not necessarily respond negatively to it (Trump 2018). 
Latinobarometer is one of the few surveys that consistently asks this question about 
distributive fairness perceptions.  Responses in the analysis range from “very fair” (coded 
1) to “very unfair” (4), and as Figure 3.3 illustrates, the modal response to this question is 
3 (“unfair”).   
Political Ideology: Although I hypothesize that, on average, all individuals should 
be less likely to trust the government or be satisfied with democracy when they perceive 
their country’s income distribution to be unfair, I also argue that the extent of this 
relationship should be conditional on political ideology.  Specifically, I explain that those 
on the political right should be less likely to view inequality as unfair in the first place, 
yet even when right-leaning individuals perceive distributive unfairness, as they do in 
Latin America (see Appendix Figure B1 for the distribution of distributive fairness 
perceptions across the ideological spectrum in the most recent Latinobarometer survey), 
they should be less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result. Political ideology 
comes from the question, “in politics, people normally speak of “left” and “right.”  On a 
scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?”  The modal 
ideological response in the pooled data sample is a “5,” with about 32 percent of 
respondents indicating that they are in the middle of the ideological scale.  The rest of 
respondents are fairly evenly distributed around the middle, with about 31 percent of 
respondents to the left and 37 of respondents to the right of the middle.   
Subjective Class Status: I also hypothesize that individuals’ class status conditions 
the relationship between inequality, fairness perceptions, and subsequent evaluations of 
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the government.  Prior research has operationalized “class” in a variety of ways, 
including socioeconomic status measures based on income (Gilens 2009; Llores, Rosset, 
and Wüest 2015) and education (Putnam 1976; Taylor-Robinson 2010), and more 
recently, occupational status (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Barnes and Saxton 
2019).  Occupational-based measure of class are ideal because the primary class 
cleavages in most societies revolve around the labor market and how individuals earn a 
living (Carnes 2013, 3).  Unfortunately, Latinobaromoeter does not consistently ask about 
individuals’ occupations, Thus I cannot construct an occupation-based measure of social 
class.  Instead, I rely on a class self-placement question that asks individuals whether they 
perceive themselves as belonging to the “lower” (coded 1), “lower middle” (2), “middle” 
(3), “upper middle” (4), or “upper” class (5).  The modal subjective social class response 
is 3, with about 40 percent of respondents perceiving themselves as belonging to the 
middle class.  Only about 5 percent of respondents perceive themselves as belonging to 
either the “upper middle” or “upper” class.10   
Governance Quality: In addition to individual-level factors, I hypothesize that 
governance quality should ameliorate the negative influence of perceived distributive 
unfairness on political support.  Previous research has identified a number of different 
ways for measuring governance quality, one of which is corruption. In the results below, 
I operationalize governance quality as control of corruption, using a measure from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
                                                 
10 Subjective social class is only moderately correlated with either education (r=.29) or 
an asset-based measure of wealth (r=.28) in the pooled data sample.  Latinobaromoeter 
does not ask about respondents’ income in the period under investigation.   
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Mastruzzi 2010).11  Control of corruption captures “[expert] perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.” The control of 
corruption figures used in this analysis correspond to the year immediately preceding the 
respective Latinobarometer wave.  The control of corruption measure theoretically 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating lower levels of corruption.  In this 
sample, the control of corruption measure ranges from -1.38 (Venezuela in 2015) to 1.56 
(Chile in 2013), with a mean value of -.30.12  In Appendix Table B1 and B2, I 
demonstrate that the results are also robust to other measures of governance quality, 
including WGI measures of rule of law, voice and accountability, and government 
effectiveness. 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
To control for potential sources of spuriousness, I include a number of individual-
level variables in the main analysis that existing research consistently shows to be 
important predictors of support for the political system and that theoretically could 
correlate with perceptions of distributive unfairness, particularly: support for the 
incumbent government and perceptions of the national economy.  Individuals who 
approve of the incumbent and express favorable evaluations of the economy are more 
likely to support the political system (e.g., Anderson et al. 2005; McAllister 1999), and 
these individuals could be less likely to blame the government for unfavorable 
                                                 
11 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc for methodology and information 
about control of corruption other WGI measures of governance quality. 
12 See Appendix Figure B2 for the distribution. 
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distributive outcomes.  Support for the incumbent comes from the question, “Do you 
approve or not of the performance of the government led by President (name)?”  
Responses are coded such that 0=Disapprove and 1=Approve. Perceptions of the national 
economy comes from the question, “Do you consider the country’s present economic 
situation to be better (coded 1), a little better (2), the same (3), a little worse (4), or much 
worse (5) than 12 months ago?” To rule out the possibility that socioeconomic factors are 
driving both political support and perceptions of distributive unfairness, I control for 
wealth quintile (Córdova 2009) and education, as well as respondent’s sex, age, and 
whether the respondent lives in a rural area.   
In addition to individual-level covariates, I control for factors at the country-level 
that could theoretically correlate with fairness perceptions and political support, 
particularly aggregate levels of inequality.  Although the focus here is on perceptions of 
fairness of the income distribution, as opposed to objective levels of inequality, there is 
reason to suspect that aggregate inequality could affect both perceptions of distributive 
unfairness (Trump 2018) and support for the political system (e.g., Anderson and Singer 
2008; Zmerli and Castillo 2015).  To account for this possibility, I include a measure of 
net national-level income inequality from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (Solt, 2016). Inequality figures represent the most recent available Gini 
coefficients prior to the survey year.   
3.3 Perceptions of Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction with Democracy 
To test Hypothesis 1, that individuals who perceive their country’s income 
distribution as unfair will be express lower levels of political support, I estimate a series 
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of multilevel ordered logit regressions in which satisfaction with democracy is the 
dependent variable.  Table 3.1 includes a series of baseline models without any 
interactions.  Models 1 and 2 include only individual-level covariates, Model 3 introduces 
governance quality (control of corruption), and Model 4 includes all individual-level and 
higher-order variables.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on perceived 
distributive unfairness is negative and statistically significant across model specifications. 
In Figure 3.4, I present this relationship graphically by calculating and plotting the 
predicted probability of observing each satisfaction with democracy response outcome, 
for each value of perceived distributive unfairness.  Consistent again with my main 
theoretical argument and Hypothesis 1, individuals who view the income distribution as 
unfair are more likely than those who perceive it as fair to be “very dissatisfied” or 
“dissatisfied” with democracy, and less likely to be “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with 
democracy.  In substantive terms, individuals who view the income distribution in their 
country as “very fair” only have a .06 probability of being “very dissatisfied” with 
democracy (top-left panel in Figure 3.4), where as individuals who view the income 
distribution as “very unfair” have a .24 probability of being “very dissatisfied.”  Turning 
to the bottom-right panel in Figure 3.4, individuals who perceive the income distribution 
as “very fair” have a .23 probability of being “very satisfied” with the way democracy 
works in their country, compared to a .06 probability for individuals who view the 
income distribution as “very unfair.” 
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Table 3.1 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction with Democracy, Baseline 
Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Perceived Distributive Unfairness -.82*** -.58*** -.58*** -.57*** 
 (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
Political Ideology 0-10=Right  .00 .00 .00 
  (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Subjective social class  .07*** .07*** .07*** 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Governance Quality   .45*** .31** 
   (.12) (.10) 
Individual-Level Control     
Economic Perception (Worse)  -.42*** -.42*** -.42*** 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Education  -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** 
  (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Rural  .04 .04 .04 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Incumbent Approval  .80*** .80*** .80*** 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Wealth Quintile  .01 .01 .01 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Female  -.03 -.03 -.03 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Country-Level Control     
Income Inequality    -.10*** 
    (.02) 
Cut 1 -4.22*** -4.44*** -4.59*** -9.07*** 
 (.14) (.14) (.16) (.85) 
Cut 2 -1.96*** -2.03*** -2.18*** -6.66*** 
 (.14) (.14) (.15) (.85) 
Cut 3 .11 .13 -.02 -4.50*** 
 (.14) (.14) (.15) (.84) 
Observations 54,516 40620 40620 40620 
Country-Years 54 54 54 54 
Wald Chi2 371.49 3994.21 4012.23 4050.88 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients. 
DV: “How satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in your country?” very dissatisfied 
(coded 1) to very satisfied (coded 4). 
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Figure 3.4 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
 
Note: Point estimates represent the predicted probability of observing a given outcome, bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. Predicted probabilities were calculated using the results in 
Table 3.1, Model 4. 
 
In the next section, I turn to the interactive models in Table 3.2 to examine how 
individuals’ class and political ideology, as well as a country’s governance quality, 
condition the relationship between perceptions of distributive unfairness and satisfaction 
with democracy.  Model 1 in Table 3.2 includes an individual-level interaction between 
subjective social class and perceived unfairness (H2).  Model 2 includes an individual-
level interaction between political ideology and perceived unfairness (H3).  Model 3 
includes a cross-level interaction between governance quality and perceived unfairness 
(H4).  Model 4 includes all interactions as a robustness check, but in the sections below, I 
focus on Models 1-3 for my discussion of the results.  
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Table 3.2 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction, Interactive Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Perceived Distributive Unfairness -.57*** -.70*** -.52*** -.60*** 
 (.04) (.03) (.02) (.04) 
Subjective Social Class .10* .07*** .07*** .11** 
 (.04) (.01) (.01) (.04) 
Unfair X Class -.01   -.02 
 (.01)   (.01) 
Political Ideology 0-10=Right -.01* -.06*** -.00 -.07*** 
 (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) 
Unfair X Ideology  .02***  .02*** 
  (.00)  (.00) 
Governance Quality .43*** .43*** -.22* -.24* 
 (.09) (.09) (.11) (.11) 
Unfair X Governance   .21*** .22*** 
   (.02) (.02) 
Individual-Level Control     
Economic Perception (Worse) -.43*** -.43*** -.42*** -.42*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Education -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Rural .04 .04 .04 .04 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Incumbent Approval .82*** .82*** .82*** .81*** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Wealth Quintile .01 .01 .01 .01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Female -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Country-Level Control     
Income Inequality -.07*** -.07*** -.08*** -.07*** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Cut 1 -8.02*** -8.32*** -7.89*** -8.04*** 
 (.77) (.76) (.77) (.78) 
Cut 2 -5.63*** -5.93*** -5.49*** -5.64*** 
 (.76) (.76) (.77) (.78) 
Cut 3 -3.48*** -3.78*** -3.34*** -3.49*** 
 (.76) (.76) (.77) (.78) 
Observations 40620 40620 40620 40620 
Country-Years 54 54 54 54 
Wald Chi2 7458.48 7471.94 7581.21 7601.81 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients. 
DV: “How satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in your country?” very dissatisfied (coded 
1) to very satisfied (4). 
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3.3.1 Class, Fairness Perceptions, and Satisfaction with Democracy 
Hypothesis 2 posits that the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness 
and political support will be weakest among upper-class individuals.  Although the 
relationship between subjective social class and satisfaction with democracy, on its own, 
is positive and significant in Table 3.1, the results in Table 3.2 Models 1 and 4 suggest 
that class does not condition relationship between fairness perceptions and political 
support.  The interactions between subjective social class and perceived distributive 
unfairness in both models are insignificant.  The marginal effect of an increase in 
perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of observing the “very dissatisfied” 
outcome is around .07, regardless of social class.  Likewise, the marginal effect of an 
increase in perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of observing the “very 
dissatisfied” is consistently between -.05 and -.06, regardless of subjective social class.  
Although the negative effect of perceived distributive unfairness on observing the “very 
dissatisfied” outcome appears slightly stronger for upper-class compared to lower-class 
individuals, these differences are not statistically different.  The results in Table 3.2, 
Models 1 and 4, do not lend support for Hypothesis 2: subjective social class has no 
discernable conditioning effect on the relationship between fairness perceptions and 
satisfaction with democracy.   
3.3.2 Political Ideology, Fairness Perceptions, and Satisfaction with Democracy 
Turning to Models 2 and 4 in Table 3.2, the positive and significant coefficient on 
the interaction term suggests, consistent with Hypothesis 3, that political ideology 
conditions the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and satisfaction  
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Figure 3.5 Political Ideology, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Satisfaction 
 
 
=  
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with democracy.  Since Hypothesis 3 posits that moving to the right on the political 
ideological spectrum should weaken the relationship between fairness perceptions and 
political support, I present two different graphical representations of the interaction in 
Model 2.  The panels on the left side of Figure 3.5 show the marginal effect of an 
increase in perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of observing a given 
response outcome.  When interpreting marginal effects, the further away a point estimate 
is from y=0, the stronger the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variable. Negative (positive) marginal effects mean that an increase in the independent 
variable is associated with a decrease (increase) in the dependent variable.  
If Hypothesis 3 is correct, we should observe the marginal effect estimates 
weakening, or becoming less positive or negative, as we move from left to right on the 
ideological spectrum.  Indeed, this is exactly what the panels in the left column of Figure 
3.5 show.  Although the marginal effect of an increase in perceived unfairness is 
associated with an increase in the probability of being dissatisfied and a decrease in the 
probability of being satisfied with democracy for all individuals, this relationship is 
weakest on the right of the political spectrum. Yet, the right column of Figure 3.5 shows 
that this change in marginal effects is actually being driven by people who view the 
income distribution as “very fair.”   
Predicted satisfaction, regardless of the response outcome, is relatively similar 
across the ideological spectrum for individuals who perceive the income distribution as 
“very unfair.”  Yet, those on the right are more likely than those on the left to be 
“dissatisfied” with democracy when they perceive the income distribution as “very fair,” 
and less likely to be “very satisfied” when they view the income distribution as “very 
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fair.”  The largest satisfaction gap between those who view the income distribution as 
“very unfair” compared to “very fair” exists among people on the left of the political 
spectrum.  In this sense, the results in Figure 3.5 lend support to Hypothesis 3, in that 
fairness perceptions matter more for political support among left-leaning individuals.  In 
one way, this finding is consistent with literature on the moral foundations of political 
ideology.  Recall, this literature posits that those on the political left are more likely to 
moralize outcomes they perceive as unfair or harmful to others, whereas those on the 
political right care more about order, authority, and the political and economic status quo 
(Graham et al 2009; 2012).  However, that the narrowing satisfaction gap as we move 
from left to right on the ideological spectrum is actually being driven by changes in 
perceptions of fairness, as opposed to perceptions of unfairness, is not consistent with my 
argument that individuals on the political right are more likely to rely on legitimizing 
narratives the allay their political concerns about inequality, at least when it comes to 
satisfaction with democracy.  Perceptions of distributive fairness or unfairness simply 
matter less for those on the right than those on the left when it comes to evaluating the 
functioning of democracy.   
3.3.3 Governance Quality, Fairness Perceptions, and Satisfaction with Democracy 
In Chapter 2, I also laid out expectations that governance quality will condition 
how citizens use their fairness judgments to evaluate the political system.  Specifically, 
Hypothesis 4 posits that good governance should weaken the negative relationship 
between perceived distributive unfairness and support for the political system. Although 
inequality and perceived distributive injustice should erode political support by 
challenging citizens’ normative expectations about the outcomes that democracy is 
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supposed to produce, the presence of good governance provides alternative information 
that the democratic process is functioning properly.  However, weak state capacity and 
poor governance compound the damaging effects of inequality.  Not only do citizens 
view as the unfair distributive outcome tied to government inaction, but bad governance, 
such as pervasive corruption, impedes governments’ ability to enact effective pro-
egalitarian reforms. As a legislative aid for a National Deputy in Argentina noted, “The 
state is promoting lots of policies and projects to reduce inequality, but resources like 
houses and money aren’t being given to the right people; they’re in the wrong hands 
because of corruption.”13  When programs meant to reduce social and economic 
inequalities are not administered impartially, the democratic process is not affording all 
citizens equal opportunities for economic progress, and hence citizens should be more 
likely to express political dissatisfaction for what they perceive as an unfair economic 
distribution.   
In Table 3.2, Model 3, I include a cross-level interaction between individuals’ 
fairness perceptions and a country’s governance quality, which I operationalize using a 
measure of control of corruption from the World Banks’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010).   The coefficient on the 
interaction term in Model 3 is positive and significant.  In the left column of Figure 3.6, I  
                                                 
13 Author interview, June 2018.  The interviews used in this dissertation are based on a 
convenience sample of Argentine political elites in Buenos Aires.  Although not 
generalizable to all political elites in Argentina or Latin America, these interviews offer 
supporting examples of prior theoretical arguments and help contextualize empirical 
results from cross-national analysis.   
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Figure 3.6  Governance Quality, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Satisfaction 
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use the results from Table 3.2, Model 3 to calculate and plot the average marginal effect 
of an increase in perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of observing each 
satisfaction with democracy response outcome, across the range of governance quality 
(control of corruption) values in the sample.  In the right panel of Figure 3.6, I do the 
same, but instead of marginal effects, I calculate and plot the predicted probability of 
observing each outcome, for individuals who view the income distribution as “very fair” 
(black solid line) and “very unfair (gray dashed line).  Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the 
positive effect of an increase in perceived unfairness on the probability of observing the 
“very dissatisfied” outcome weakens as governance quality improves (top-left panel).  
Likewise, the negative effect of an increase in perceived unfairness on the probability of 
observing “satisfied” or “very satisfied” also weakens as governance quality improves.  
Although an increase in perceived distributive unfairness is associated with a decrease in 
the probability of being “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the way democracy is 
functioning, on average, this relationship is considerably weaker in a context of good 
governance than in a context of poor governance. 
Turning to the right column in Figure 3.6, the conditioning effect of governance 
quality on the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and satisfaction with 
democracy is most pronounced among citizens who perceive their country’s income 
distribution as “very unfair.”  Individuals who perceive the income distribution as “very  
fair” have a consistently low baseline probability of being dissatisfied with democracy, 
and a consistently high probability of being satisfied.  Yet, improvements in governance 
quality are associated with a narrowing of the “satisfaction gap” between people who 
perceive their country’s income distribution as “very fair” compared to “very unfair.”  In 
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substantive terms, an individual who perceives her country’s income as “very unfair” has 
a .35 probability of being “very dissatisfied” with democracy in a context of poor 
governance.  In a context of good governance, however, that same individual would only 
have a .09 probability of being “very dissatisfied” with democracy.  Conversely, an 
individual who views her country’s income distribution as “very unfair” only has a .03 
probability of being “very satisfied” with democracy in a context of poor governance.  In 
a context of good governance, however, that same individual would have a .15 
probability of being “very satisfied.”   
Consistent with my theoretical expectations, good governance significantly 
mitigates the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on satisfaction with 
democracy.  Even when individuals perceive their country’s income distribution to be 
fundamentally unfair, they are still less likely to be dissatisfied and more likely to be 
satisfied with the way their democracy functions when they live in a country with good 
governance.  Taken together, the results in Table 3.2, Model 3, and Figure 3.6 are fully 
consistent with Hypothesis 4.  Although poor governance signals to citizens that 
inequality cannot effectively be addressed through the democratic process, good 
governance significantly mitigates the negative influence of perceived distributive 
unfairness on satisfaction with democracy.   
3.4 Perceptions of Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government 
In these final sections of Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between 
individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness and trust in government.  As previously 
mentioned, trust in government is another important indicator of support for the political 
64 
 
system.  Trust allows political institutions to function properly (Cleary and Stokes 2006; 
Hetherington 1998), and it helps ensure citizens’ acquiescence, especially regarding 
policies and political outcomes that people disagree with (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
2005; Tankebe 2013).  The discussion of results in this section will proceed like the 
satisfaction with democracy results.  First, I will present a series of baseline multilevel 
ordered logit models and will use these models to discuss the relationship between 
perceived distributive unfairness and trust in government (Hypothesis 1).  Next, I present 
a series of interactive models that allow me to test my hypotheses about the conditioning 
effect of class (H2), political ideology (H3), and governance quality (H4). 
The results in Table 3.3 are consistent with my main theoretical argument that 
perceived distributive unfairness erodes support for the political system.  Across model 
specifications, the coefficient on perceived distributive unfairness is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that individuals are less likely to trust the national 
government when they perceive their country’s income distribution as unfair.  Turning 
briefly to some of the other independent variables in Table 3.3, subjective social class and 
governance quality are positively associated with trust, with upper-class individuals and 
people in countries with good governance being more likely to trust the government, on 
average. Individuals who approve of the incumbent president are also more likely to trust 
the government. Being on the right of the political spectrum is associated with decreased 
trust, as is expressing negative evaluations of the economy, having a higher level of 
education, being a woman, and living in a country with high income inequality.   
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Table 3.3 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government, Baseline Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Perceived Distributive Unfairness -.76*** -.50*** -.50*** -.50*** 
 (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Political Ideology 0-10=Right  -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** 
  (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Subjective Social Class  .06*** .06*** .06*** 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Governance Quality   .21** .17* 
   (.07) (.07) 
Individual-Level Control     
Economic Perception (Worse)  -.39*** -.39*** -.39*** 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Education  -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** 
  (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Rural  .05* .05* .05* 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Incumbent Approval  1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Wealth Quintile  .00 .00 .00 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Female  -.04* -.04* -.04* 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Country-Level Control     
Income Inequality    -.04** 
    (.02) 
Cut 1 -3.41*** -3.19*** -3.26*** -5.13*** 
 (.16) (.16) (.17) (.72) 
Cut 2 -1.77*** -1.32*** -1.39*** -3.25*** 
 (.16) (.16) (.17) (.72) 
Cut 3 .05 .72*** .66*** -1.21 
 (.16) (.16) (.17) (.72) 
Observations 75926 41221 41221 41221 
Country-Years 54 54 54 54 
Wald Chi2 229.75 7502.38 7515.82 7523.87 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients. 
DV: “How much trust do you have in the national government?” none (coded 1) to a lot (4). 
 
Yet even after accounting for all of these other factors, individuals who perceive 
their country’s income distribution as unfair are still discernibly less likely to trust the  
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national government. Figure 3.7 shows this direct effect graphically.  In substantive 
terms, individuals who view their country’s income distribution as “very fair” have a .14 
probability of saying the trust the national government “not at all,” whereas individuals 
who view the income distribution as “very unfair” have a .35 probability of indicating no 
trust in the government. Conversely, individuals who view the income distribution as 
“very fair” have a .23 probability of trusting the government “a lot,” compared to a .07 
probability for people who view the income distribution as “very unfair.”  Taken 
together, the results in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.7 are fully consistent with Hypothesis 1: 
people who perceive the income distribution in their country are less likely to support the 
political system, as indicated by their level of trust in the national government.   
Figure 3.7 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government 
 
 
Notes: Bars represent 95% CIs around point estimates.  Calculated using Table 3.3, Model 4. 
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3.4.1 Class, Fairness Perceptions, and Trust in Government 
Model 1 in Table 3.4 includes an individual-level interaction between subjective 
social class and fairness perceptions and allows me to test the hypothesis that the 
relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and political support will be 
weaker among upper-class compared to lower-class individuals.  The interaction 
coefficient in Model 1 is negative and significant (p=.02).  To aid in the interpretation of 
this interaction, I calculate and plot the marginal effect of an increase in perceived 
distributive unfairness on the probability of observing each trust outcome option, for each 
subjective social class value in the left column of Figure 3.8.  In the right column of 
Figure 3.8, I do the same, except I plot predicted probabilities for individuals who 
perceive the income distribution as “very fair” and “very unfair.” 
As Figure 3.8 shows, relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and 
trust in government is stronger for upper-class than for lower-class citizens.  The 
marginal effect of an increase in perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of 
observing trust “none” or “a little” (two top-left panels) is positive and significantly 
different from zero for all individuals, although this effect strongest for self-identified 
upper-class individuals.  Conversely, the average marginal effect of an increase in 
perceived unfairness on the probability of observing trust “some” or “a lot” (two bottom-
left panels) is negative for all individuals, although strongest among the upper-class.  
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Table 3.4  Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government, Interactive 
Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Perceived Distributive Unfairness -.44*** -.63*** -.47*** -.51*** 
 (.03) (.03) (.02) (.04) 
Subjective Social Class .15*** .06*** .06*** .16*** 
 (.04) (.01) (.01) (.04) 
Unfair X Social Class -.03*   -.04** 
 (.01)   (.01) 
Political Ideology 0-10=Right -.03*** -.09*** -.03*** -.10*** 
 (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) 
Unfair X Ideology  .02***  .03*** 
  (.00)  (.00) 
Governance Quality .14* .15* -.29*** -.31*** 
 (.06) (.07) (.08) (.08) 
Unfair X Governance    .14*** .15*** 
   (.02) (.02) 
Individual-Level Control     
Economic Perception (Worse) -.40*** -.40*** -.40*** -.39*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Education -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Rural .05* .05* .06* .05* 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Incumbent Approval 1.59*** 1.58*** 1.58*** 1.58*** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Wealth Quintile .00 .00 .01 .01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Female -.04* -.04* -.04* -.04* 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Country-Level Control     
Income Inequality -.04*** -.04*** -.05*** -.04*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Cut 1 -5.17*** -5.66*** -5.25*** -5.30*** 
 (.55) (.55) (.54) (.55) 
Cut 2 -3.30*** -3.79*** -3.39*** -3.44*** 
 (.55) (.55) (.54) (.55) 
Cut 3 -1.29* -1.78** -1.38* -1.42** 
 (.55) (.55) (.54) (.55) 
Observations 41221 41221 41221 41221 
Country-Years 54 54 54 54 
Wald Chi2 11096.09 11114.73 11137.34 11169.31 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients. 
DV: “How much trust do you have in the national government?” none (coded 1) to a lot (4). 
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Figure 3.8 Class, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Trust in Government 
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The panels on the right of Figure 3.8 show that most of the conditioning effect of 
class is evident among individuals who perceive the income distribution as “very fair,” 
and the differences between lower-class and upper-class individuals are most pronounced 
for the “little” and “a lot” outcome options.  Among individuals who view their country’s 
income distribution as “very fair,” upper-class individuals have a lower probability, 
compared to lower-class individuals, of saying they trust the government only “a little,” 
and a higher probability of saying they trust the government “a lot” (nearly ten 
percentage points higher).  Class, however, has a negligible conditioning effect on the 
relationship between “very unfair” perceptions of the income distribution and trust in 
government.  All individuals, regardless of class, have a consistently high probability of 
saying they have no trust in the national government (around .35), and a relatively low 
probability of saying they trust the government “a lot” (around .07). 
In sum, the results in this section are inconsistent with my argument that the 
relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and political support should be 
weaker among upper-class than lower-class individuals.  Not only is the relationship 
between perceived distributive unfairness and trust stronger for upper-class than lower-
class individuals, but the largest “trust gap” (where there is one in Figure 3.8) between 
“very fair” and “very unfair” perceptions of the income distribution is for those upper-
class respondents in the sample.  Moreover, the fact that I observe no difference in lower-
class and upper-class individuals’ trust in government when they perceive the income 
distribution as unfair suggests that upper-class individuals, at least in this Latin American 
context, are not relying on system-justifying narratives to absolve the government of 
blame for any perceived distributive unfairness they experience.   
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3.4.2 Political Ideology, Fairness Perceptions, and Trust in Government 
Model 2 in Table 3.4 includes an individual-level interaction between left-right political 
ideology and perceived distributive unfairness.  The coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive and significant, indicating that political ideology conditions the relationship 
between individuals’ perceptions of the income distribution and their trust in the national 
government.  The marginal effects and predicted probabilities in Figure 3.9 are 
remarkably similar to the relationship between fairness perceptions, political ideology, 
and satisfaction with democracy discussed in the previous section.  Consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and trust in 
government weakens with a move from left to right on the ideological spectrum.  That is, 
the positive relationship between perceived unfairness and trusting the government 
“none” or “a little” is less positive among right-leaning individuals than left-leaning 
individuals, and the negative relationship between perceived unfairness and trusting the 
government “some” or “a lot” becomes less negative with a move to the right. 
As the predicted probability panels on the right of Figure 3.9 illustrate, the 
conditioning effect of political ideology is most evident among people who perceive their 
country’s income distribution as “very fair.” Whereas all individuals who perceive the 
income distribution as “very unfair”, regardless of political ideology, have a relatively 
high probability of saying the trust the government “none,” and a relatively low 
probability of indicating trust “a lot,” the relationship between “very fair” perceptions 
and trust varies considerably depending on political ideology.  Turning first to the top-
right panel in Figure 3.9, individuals who perceive their country’s income distribution as   
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Figure 3.9 Political Ideology, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Trust in 
Government 
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 “very unfair” have about a .35 probability of indicating they have no trust in the national 
government.  Among individuals who perceive the income distribution as “very fair,” 
those on the left have a .09 probability of indicating no trust, compared to those on right 
who’s predicted probability is around .16, a nearly 80% higher probability.  Turning to 
the bottom-right panel in Figure 3.9, individuals who perceive the income distribution as 
“very unfair” only have a .07 probability of saying they trust the government “a lot,” 
regardless of their political ideology.   
Yet, when those on the left perceive the income distribution as “very fair,” they 
have a .29 probability of saying they trust the government “a lot,” compared to a .19 
probability for those on the right of the political spectrum.  In sum, the results in Table 
3.4, Model 2, and Figure 3.9 lend partial support to Hypothesis 3.  The relationship 
between individuals’ fairness perceptions and trust in government is weaker among those 
on the right of the political spectrum, compared to those on the left.  In this sense, the 
results in Figure 3.9 are consistent with Hypothesis 3.  But, the conditioning effect of 
political ideology on this relationship is most evident among people who perceive the 
income distribution as “very fair.”  Among people on the left, there is a large trust gap 
between those who perceive the income distribution as “very fair” versus “very unfair.”  
This trust gap is significantly smaller on the right of the political spectrum, but only 
because right-leaning individuals are more likely than left-leaning individuals to distrust 
the government, and less likely to trust the government, when they perceive the income 
distribution as fair.   
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3.4.3 Governance Quality, Fairness Perceptions, and Trust in Government 
This section offers an additional test of Hypothesis 4, that governance quality will 
mitigate the negative effect of perceived distribution unfairness on political support.  As 
the positive and significant coefficient on the cross-level interaction term in Table 3.4, 
Model 3 suggests, the relationship between individuals’ fairness perceptions and trust in 
government is indeed conditional on the quality of governance in a country.  Figure 3.10 
presents this cross-level interaction graphically.  As with democratic satisfaction, the 
positive relationship between an increase in perceived unfairness and the trust “none” 
outcome weakens considerably as governance quality improves (top left panel).  
Likewise, the negative relationship between perceived unfairness and the trust “some” 
and “a lot” outcomes weakens as governance quality improves (two bottom-left panels).  
Although perceiving the income distribution as increasingly unfair is associated with a 
decreased probability of trusting the national government, on average, this negative 
relationship is most pronounced in countries with poor governance quality.   
As the right panels in Figure 3.10 illustrate, governance quality has the most 
pronounced conditioning effect for “very unfair” perceptions.  Turning first to the top-
right panel, individuals who view their country’s income distribution as “very unfair” 
have a .40 probability of indicating they have no trust in the national government when 
they live in a country with poor governance quality.  In countries with the best 
governance quality in the sample, however, these same individuals have a .24 probability 
of indicating no trust in the government.  Turning to the “some” and “a lot” outcomes, 
Figure 3.10 illustrates the point that good governance mitigates the pernicious influence 
of perceived distributive unfairness on trust in government.  Among individuals who  
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perceive their country’s income distribution as “very unfair,” the probability of observing 
the trust “a lot” outcome is only .05 in a context of poor governance.  In countries with 
good governance, however, this probability more than doubles to .11.  The conditioning 
effect of governance quality is likewise pronounced for the trust “some” (=3) outcome 
(which is nearly as common as the “none” outcome in the pooled sample, around 28 
percent of respondents).  In countries with poor governance quality, individuals who 
perceive the income distribution as “very unfair.” have a .20 probability of saying the 
trust the national government “some” of the time.  In countries with good governance 
quality, this probability increases by nearly .10.   
In sum, the results in this section lend strong support to my hypothesis about 
fairness perceptions, governance quality, and political support (H4).  Good governance 
significantly mitigates the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on 
political support.  The “trust gap” between people who perceive their country’s income 
distribution as “very fair” compared to “very unfair” is widest where governance quality 
is the worst in Latin America.  As governance quality improves, this “trust gap” narrows, 
primarily because individuals who perceive high levels of distributive unfairness in 
society are nonetheless willing to express political trust.  Although inequality in Latin 
America is likely to remain high by global standards for the foreseeable future, these 
results offer optimism for the prospects of democratic stability in the region.   
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
Political support is at troubling low levels and has been steadily declining during 
the last decade in a number of Latin American countries.  In Brazil, for instance, recent 
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high-profile corruption scandals coupled with a severe economic recession have left 
citizens disillusioned with their democratic institutions.14  Prior research has linked 
dissatisfaction and disenchantment with democratic institutions to weak state capacity 
and poor governance (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Kumlin and Esaisson 2012; 
Mainwaring 2006; Weitz-Shapiro 2008), legislative gridlock (Singh and Carlin 2015), 
and economic inequality (Anderson and Singer 2008). In this chapter, I advance these 
scholarly lines of inquiry by examining how individuals’ perceptions of distributive 
(un)fairness in a region plagued by high inequality affects individuals’ evaluations of the 
political system.  
Table 3.5 Hypotheses and Empirical Support 
Hypothesis Supported? 
H1: On average, citizens who perceive the distribution of income in 
their country as unfair will express lower levels of political support than 
individuals who view the income distribution as fair. 
Yes 
H2: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness 
and political support will be weakest among upper-class individuals. 
No 
H3: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness 
and political support will be weakest among right-leaning individuals. 
Partially 
H4: Good governance will weaken the negative relationship between 
perceived distributive unfairness and political support.  
Yes 
 
Using a multilevel analysis of public opinion data from 18 Latin American 
countries (2011-2015), I show that even when controlling for aggregate levels of income 
inequality, individuals are less likely to be satisfied with democracy or trust the 
                                                 
14 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-brazil-nostalgia-grows-for-
the-dictatorship--not-the-brutality-but-the-law-and-order/2018/03/14/bc58ded2-1cdd-
11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7fe0436d084 
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government when they perceive their country’s income distribution to be unfair.  This 
cross-national analysis also reveals that both of the aforementioned relationships are 
conditioned by individuals’ political ideology, as well as the context of governance 
quality in a country.  Table 3.5 summarizes the hypotheses that are tested in this chapter, 
and which of these hypotheses are consistent with the empirical results discussed in the 
preceding sections. 
Although purely observations research designs such as the one in this chapter do 
not afford scholars an airtight exposition of causality, results from my multilevel analysis 
are consistent with my theory that individuals are, on average, less likely to be satisfied 
with democracy or trust the government when they perceive high levels of distributive 
unfairness.  Moreover, this result holds even after controlling for other previously 
theorized determinants of political support, such as aggregate levels of income inequality, 
as well as approval of the incumbent government and retrospective evaluations of the 
economy.  To further isolate the causal effects of inequality and perceptions of 
distributive unfairness, I have designed a series of survey experiment that will allow me 
to test my theorized causal mechanisms.  In Chapter 4, I use a survey experiment to 
investigate how information about distributive (un)fairness affects support for the 
political system, as well as how these treatment effects vary by class and political 
ideology.  In Chapter 5, I use another survey experiment to investigate how governance 
quality affects individuals’ political evaluations of economic inequality. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. INEQUALITY AND FAIRNESS FRAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM 
ARGENTINA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
In the first empirical chapter of this dissertation, I used cross-national survey data 
from 18 Latin American countries to show that perceptions of distributive unfairness are 
negatively correlated with democratic satisfaction.  Although the cross-national analysis 
in Chapter 3 is consistent with my theoretical argument that perceptions of distributive 
unfairness are a key factor whereby economic inequalities in society erodes support for 
the political system, such observational designs do not allow me to offer an airtight 
exposition of causality. Hence, I turn to an experimental design, which offers a number of 
advantages over purely observational studies when it comes to isolating causal effects.  
Experiments give researchers control over the data generating process—in particular, 
control over exposure to the independent variable, or treatment—thus allowing for 
greater certainty that an observed change in the dependent variable is the result of the 
independent variable. 
 In this chapter, I discuss the results of survey experiments from Argentina, 
Mexico, and the United States in which I present participants with information about 
rising economic inequality, frame this increase in inequality as either an unfair or fair 
distributive outcome, and then evaluate support for the political system.  By conducting a 
series of single-country studies, I am able to hold actual levels of inequality constant in 
each experiment while simultaneously manipulating individuals’ perceptions of 
distributive (un)fairness.  Recall from Chapter 2 that while all individuals should be 
distressed by disproportionate economic outcomes (Jost and Kay 2010; Waksalk et al. 
2007), they oftentimes “cognitively adjust” by rationalizing inequality (Jost et al. 2003, 
80 
 
Tyler 2006) or adopting legitimizing stereotypes that justify group differences (Cassese, 
Barnes, and Branton 2015; Cassese and Holman 2017; Kay and Jost 2003; Tyler 2006).  
Indeed, a constant theme that has come up in nearly every elite interview I conducted in 
Argentina, over the course of two years and with elites from across the political spectrum, 
is that a major cause of inequality is that Argentina lacks a “culture of work.”  When I 
ask political elites – who by and large are now members of the upper-strata of society, 
regardless of their backgrounds – “what do you think are some of the causes of persistent 
inequality in Argentina,” common responses include: 
“People don’t have a working culture, there’s an idea that life is easier than it 
actually is, we need to re-educate and create a commitment with work, for them to 
know what it is to wake up early, go to work, get the food to the table. All this 
culture has been lost on 1/3 of the population of Argentina.”15 
“I believe the social policies have to help people work, rather than just giving 
them everything.  They will become used to the state giving them everything and 
then they will stop working.”16 
“I believe that we don’t have an employment culture, a culture related to work.  
People who can get a job aren’t interested in working because the state will give 
you lots of things like housing and food. There’s a great problem with 
employment…It’s very hard to find employees to work in your business if you’re 
a CEO.  The system is complicated because people who get welfare benefits from 
the state lose these benefits if they start a job.  So, they choose not to work so they 
can keep the social welfare benefits.”17   
 
Although some individuals, in particular elites in society, are quick to blame 
inequality on a lack of work ethic among the lower classes – a clear example of 
stereotypes meant to legitimize inequality – others place the blame squarely on the 
                                                 
15 Author interview, Buenos Aires Provincial Deputy (UCR), March 2019. 
16 Author interview, Buenos Aires Provincial Deputy (Frente Renovador), March 2019. 
17 Author interview, aid to Argentine National Deputy (PRO), May 2018.  
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government. The notion that individuals view inequality as an unfair outcome 
inextricably linked to government (in)action is a theme that consistently emerged from a 
variety of qualitative data that I collected both in the United States and in Argentina.  
Individuals are generally less satisfied with the political system when the outcomes 
produced in a democracy do not match their normative expectations about what 
democracy should do in practice (Singh and Carlin 2015).  When citizens perceive high 
levels of distributive unfairness – for example, they perceive the distribution of wealth or 
income in their country as unfair – this signals that the democratic process is not 
producing the outcomes it was intended to produce, such as a more equitable distribution 
of economic resources (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Meltzer and Richards 1981). In 
other words, individuals view inequality through a lens of distributive unfairness when 
they see their democratic governments failing to remedy economic disparities in society – 
for instance by enacting inadequate worker protections or tax policies that 
disproportionately benefit the wealthy – and they express political dissatisfaction and 
disillusionment as a result.  
Indeed, a theme that consistently emerged from my qualitative data of survey 
respondents in the U.S. is that economic inequality is the result of unfair tax policies.  
Consider the following responses: 
“I think that unfair corporate tax policies play a major part in the unequal 
redistribution of wealth as the economy recovers. Corporate profits overpower the 
needs of the workers as well, leaving many people with unfair wages and 
benefits.” 
“I think tax loop holes are a big part of it.  The average citizen has to pay all their 
taxes or they will go to jail. Wealthy people always have ways around paying the 
taxes they are supposed to.” 
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“The loopholes and laws in place favor the wealthy to ultimately earn more.  
Taxes also favor the wealthy, keeping the wealth with the wealthy.”   
 
Similar themes are evident in Brazil as well. Katia Maria, the director of the Brazilian 
institute of Geography and Statistics, recently noted:  
“We pay a lot of taxes. But it is not that our taxation is excessive, in fact it is 
unfair. We are below the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) [in terms of tax burden] average. But it is a taxation where those 
who pay the most are the middle class and the poorest people.”18 
 
In the above examples, respondents see the causes of inequality as resulting from 
government policies that disproportionately benefit one small group of citizens at the 
expense of the rest.  Moreover, these unfair outcomes are the direct result of government 
action.  Current political leaders, who many Americans see as being in the pocket of 
business leaders, are using the tax code unfairly to make sure “the rich keep getting 
richer” (Hacker and Pierson 2010).  
 Although the above discussion suggests that individuals in the US blame 
government because they perceive a lack of equality of outcome, they also blame the 
political system for a lack of equality of opportunity.  Another common theme that 
emerged from my qualitative survey responses in the US is that the government is to 
blame for a lack of educational opportunities, which ultimately prevents upward class 
mobility: 
                                                 
18 https://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/more-than-25-million-brazilians-
living-below-poverty-line/ 
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“Poor educational opportunities for the very poorest Americans, generational 
poverty, lack of ability for poor Americans to inherit from relatives, tax codes that 
strongly favor the wealthy. 
“I think that education has a lot to do with inequality in the economy.  Too many 
young people who live at a poverty level drop out of school, and with no 
education or training they are not able to get a job that pays a decent wage and a 
way to get ahead.” 
“Poor social spending which doesn’t offer low income people the chance to climb 
up.  Education is incredibly expensive and so is healthcare.  These keep people 
locked in low end jobs with no chance of greater success.”   
 
Similar themes surrounding government’s responsibility for inequalities in 
economic opportunities emerge in both elite and media discourse in Argentina, especially 
regarding education policy.  During an elite interview, a legislative aid to a national 
Deputy from the PRO (a center-right party in Argentina that belongs to the Cambiemos 
coalition) explained that in addition to structural factors that create a cycle of poverty, 
education is a major problem in Argentina because of inequalities between public and 
private schools: “Children usually just go to public school to have lunch or a coffee 
because they are in real poverty, but they are not learning as much as the kids going to 
private schools.”   
These sentiments are echoed in media discourse as well.  An article in La Nación, 
a major national newspaper in Argentina, discusses how the public education system in 
Buenos Aires is basically divided in two, with well-equipped schools in wealthy northern 
Buenos Aires neighborhoods like Palermo, and poorly-equipped schools in the southern 
neighborhoods, where housing, employment, and health conditions are all worse as well.  
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The article goes on to explain that these inequalities in the public education system 
perpetuate other forms of socioeconomic inequality for students later in life.19  
If my expectations surrounding Hypothesis 1 are correct, I expect to see inequality 
undermine satisfaction with democracy when it is framed as an unfair distributive 
outcome, especially an outcome that impedes equality of opportunity for all citizens.  
Yet, offering individuals an opportunity to legitimize large income differences should 
mitigate the negative influence of economic inequality on political support that prior 
research has documented (Anderson and Singer 2008; Córdova and Layton 2016; 
Krieckhaus et al. 2014; Zmerli and Castillo 2015). 
4.1 Experimental Design 
The main analysis in this chapter centers around an online survey with embedded 
experimental treatments that I fielded in Argentina in February 2019.  I supplement this 
analysis with data from previous versions of the same survey experiment that I 
administered to a student sample in Mexico in Spring 2018, and to a convenience sample 
in the United States using Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk Platform in Spring 2017.  I 
choose to focus my analysis on the Argentina survey because the data are of higher 
quality and the sample was drawn to approximate national representativeness.  As I 
discuss later in the chapter, the results from Argentina are largely supportive of the 
theoretical arguments I developed in Chapter 2.  Importantly, the fact that experiments on 
convenience samples in Mexico and the United States are also fairly consistent with my 
                                                 
19 “La desigualdad en las escuelas públicas divide la ciudad en dos.” La Nación, 
Educación, Abril 2018. 
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results from Argentina speaks to both the replicability and generalizability of my 
findings.   
The main experiment analyzed in this chapter was embedded in a survey using an 
online panel from the survey firm Netquest.  The sample was drawn from a population of 
Netquest panelists over the age of 18, and quotas were used to ensure that the sample was 
nationally representative with regard to sex, age, and socioeconomic status (household 
income).  In total, 3,040 participants took part in the survey.  A subset of the sample 
(N=1,180) was randomly assigned to participate in the survey experiment analyzed in this 
chapter. This subset of participants was then randomly assigned to be in the control group 
or to receive one of three experimental treatments.  Participants in the control group read 
a neutral statement about the size of the Argentine economy in relation to other Latin 
American countries.  Participants receiving Treatment 1 also received information about 
increasing economic inequality.  Participants in Treatments 2 and 3 received the same 
information, plus one additional sentence that was designed to frame inequality as either 
an unfair (Treatment 2) or fair (Treatment 3) distributive outcome.  Of particular 
importance, the distributive (un)fairness frames that I used in the Argentina experiment 
are meant to tie information about inequality to (in)equality in opportunities, an 
important theme that emerges in qualitative data from multiple cases examined in this 
dissertation.  The exact wording of each vignette is described below: 
 
Control: Consistent with previous years, the Argentine economy was the 4th 
largest in Latin America. 
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Treatment 1: Consistent with previous years, the Argentine economy was the 4th 
largest in Latin America.  However, the gap between the rich and poor in 
Argentina is larger than it has been in 12 years. 
 
Treatment 2: Consistent with previous years, the Argentine economy was the 4th 
largest in Latin America.  However, the gap between the rich and poor in 
Argentina is larger than it has been in 12 years.  Inequality is unfair because it 
punishes children and prevents opportunities for success in the future. 
 
Treatment 3: Consistent with previous years, the Argentine economy was the 4th 
largest in Latin America.  However, the gap between the rich and poor in 
Argentina is larger than it has been in 12 years.  Inequality is fair because it 
rewards hardworking people and creates opportunities for success in the future. 
 
After reading one of these four vignettes, I asked participants about their support for the 
political system: 
With this in mind, how satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in 
Argentina?  Are you very dissatisfied (coded 1), dissatisfied (2), neither 
dissatisfied nor satisfied (3), satisfied (4), or very satisfied (5)? 
 
After the post-treatment questions, I also asked all of the participants in this 
experiment a “traditional” manipulation check question that was designed to ensure they 
received the information in the vignette they read.20  Specifically, I asked respondent to 
how large Argentina’s economy was in the scenario they read: “In the previous question, 
how large was the Argentine economy?  Was it the second largest (coded 1), third largest 
(2), fourth largest (3), or fifth largest (5) in Latin America?” At the end of the survey, all 
                                                 
20 Although this kind of manipulation check is common, especially in political science 
and psychology experiments “to assess whether or not the subject was exposed to the 
treatment by asking them a question that could only be answered by reading the 
treatment” (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2014), there is some debate about the 
effectiveness of this approach (e.g., Gerber et al. 2015). 
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participants read a debriefing statement thanking them for their participation and 
informing that all of the stories and scenarios they read were purely hypothetical.  
Unfortunately, less than half of the participants in this experiment correctly answered the 
manipulation check question (N=635).  Table C1 in the Appendix shows the subsample 
demographic breakdown, along with political ideology, subjective social class, and 
educational attainment for the full sample, compared to the manipulation check 
subsample and each of the control and treatment groups. In Appendix Table C2, I also 
show none of a variety of demographic and cognitive variables predicts assignment to 
treatment groups in either the full sample or the reduced sample of participants who 
answered the manipulation check question correctly.21  The analysis presented in this 
chapter is based on responses from participants who answered the manipulation check 
question, although I show the average treatment effects for all participants in Appendix 
Table C3. 
4.2 Results of a Survey Experiment in Argentina 
4.2.1 Satisfaction with Democracy, Average Treatment Effects 
Table 4.1 shows the average treatment effects, or the mean response to the post-
treatment question about satisfaction with democracy, for each of the three treatment 
groups compared to the control.  On average, when participants only read a neutral 
statement about the size of the economy in relation to other Latin American countries, the 
average satisfaction with democracy response was 2.85 on a 1 to 5 scale (5=very 
                                                 
21 The one exception is that in the reduced sample, women were slightly more likely to 
be assigned to Treatment 2 (Inequality framed as unfair) compared to the control in a 
multinomial logit model predicting treatment group.   
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satisfied).  When individuals receive additional information that inequality in Argentina 
is increasing (Treatment 1), and that this increase in inequality represents an unfair 
distributive outcome (Treatment 2), they indicate an average level of democratic 
satisfaction that is significantly lower (10 and 6 percent changes, respectively) than the 
control group.  Figure 4.1 shows these results graphically.    
The average treatment effects presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 are consistent 
with prior research demonstrating that income inequality is associated with decreased 
satisfaction, and they are consistent with Hypothesis 1: individuals are less likely to 
support the political system when they perceive the income distribution in the country as 
unfair.  Moreover, these results suggest that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key 
mechanisms linking economic inequality to political support. Compared to participants 
who are only told that inequality in Argentina is increasing (Treatment 1), providing 
additional information about distributive unfairness does not significantly diminish 
political support further. That is, lower levels of satisfaction with democracy, in a context 
of rising inequality, are the result of people perceiving distributive unfairness, and 
providing the extra information in Treatment 2 does not offer participants any new or 
conflicting information.  
Table 4.1 Average Treatment Effects, Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina 
Control 
ATE=2.85 
N=157 
Inequality 
ATE=2.59 
N=133 
Diff= -.26** 
Inequality + Unfair 
ATE=2.62 
N=154 
Diff= -.23* 
Inequality + Fair 
ATE=2.67 
N=140 
Diff= -.18 
Note: Two-tailed t-tests comparing each treatment to the control group *p<.10, **p<.05, 
***p<.01 
DV: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Argentina? 1=Very dissatisfied to 
5=Very satisfied 
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Yet, telling participants that rising inequality in Argentina represents a fair 
distributive outcome does affect political support differently, compared to only telling 
people that inequality is on the rise.  In fact, participants receiving Treatment 3 expressed 
levels of satisfaction with democracy that were statistically indistinguishable from 
participants in the control group who received no information about inequality.   Stated 
differently, on average, when people are given identical information about the economy 
and income inequality, political support does not suffer when rising inequality is framed 
as a fair distributive outcome. 
 
Figure 4.1 Inequality Information and Satisfaction with Democracy 
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4.2.2 Satisfaction with Democracy, Heterogeneous Effects by Political Ideology  
 In Chapter 2, I also developed hypotheses that political ideology should condition 
the relationship between inequality, fairness perceptions, and political support. Insights 
from literature on the moral foundations of political ideology suggest that those on the 
political left should be more moralize outcomes they perceive as harmful or unfair to 
others (e.g., Graham et al 2009; 2012).  Conversely, research on political ideology and 
system justification (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) suggests that those 
on the right should be more likely to rely on system legitimizing narratives that support 
the economic status quo, such as stereotypes that the poor are lazy and undeserving or 
economic wellbeing is a sign of hard work rather than luck.  The fairness frames that I 
used in Treatments 2 and 3 were designed to tap these two different ideas.  In Treatment 
2, which should resonate more with people on the political left compared to the right, 
inequality is framed as unfair because it diminishes equality of opportunity and harms 
children, one of the most vulnerable groups in society.  In Treatment 3, inequality is 
framed as fair because it rewards hardworking individuals and creates opportunities for 
economic success.  I expect such narratives will appeal more to individuals on the right of 
the political spectrum compared to the left. 
 To investigate heterogeneous effects by political ideology, I turn to regression 
analysis.  I create a dummy variable for each experimental treatment group, and then use 
these dummy variables (excluding the control group dummy as the reference category), 
to predict satisfaction with democracy.  I then interact each of the treatment dummy 
variables with participants’ political ideology.  Additionally, I include controls for 
subjective social class, sex, political interest, preference for state involvement in the 
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economy, and education.  Although including control variables can reduce the precision 
of my estimated treatment effects, Robinson and Jewell (1991) recommend this approach 
to increase the efficiency of hypothesis tests.  Table C4, Models 1 and 2 in the appendix 
shows the results of the regression analysis for participants who answered the 
manipulation check question correctly.  None of the coefficients on the interactions 
between treatment and ideology is significant in Table C4, but I nevertheless follow the 
advice of Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and present the interactions graphically.  
 The point estimates in Figure 4.2 are expected values of the satisfaction with 
democracy dependent variable based on the OSL regression results in Appendix Table 
A.4.4.  Overlapping bars around the point estimates indicate that predicted probabilities  
Figure 4.2 Political Ideology, Fairness Perceptions, and Predicted Satisfaction 
 
Note: Point estimated are predicted values from the OLS model in Appendix Table C4.  
Overlapping bars around point estimates indicate that predicted values are not significantly 
different at the 95% confidence level (Julious 2004). 
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are not significantly different at the 95 percent confidence level.22 Point estimates on the 
left are for participants who indicated that their political ideology is less than 5 on a 0 to 
10 left-right scale.  Estimates on the right are for participants who indicated an 
ideological placement greater than 5.  Although the predicted values of the DV are not 
significantly different (p<.05) within each respective panel (most likely due to the small 
number of observations in each cell after participants who answered the manipulation 
check incorrectly are excluded from the analysis), some important patterns emerge that 
nonetheless are consistent with Hypothesis 3. When individuals on the left of the political 
spectrum are presented with information about inequality, their predicted satisfaction 
with democracy drops by .31 points compared to the control group (difference significant 
at p=.12).  This drop in predicted satisfaction is almost the same whether inequality is 
framed as an unfair or fair outcome (differences from control are significant p<.10 for 
Treatment 2 and Treatment 3).23 
Although it is possible that that lack of statistically significant differences 
between predicted values in Figure 4.2 is the result of a small number of observations in 
each treatment-by-ideology group, it is also important to consider the possibility that left-
right political ideology in Argentina does not function the same way as it does in the 
United States.  Much of the literature I draw on in Chapter 2 to develop Hypothesis 3 is 
                                                 
22 As Julious (2004) explains, overlapping 84% confidence intervals indicate that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of two predicted values being the same at the 95% 
confidence level. 
23 Tests of significantly different mean predicted values were conducted using the 
“margins contrast” commands in Stata 15.1.   
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based on research in the United States, where left-right semantics are more stable than 
they are in many Latin American countries (Zechmeister 2006; 2015).  Nevertheless, 
results from a survey experiment in United States, discussed in the next section, exhibit a 
similar overall pattern for heterogeneous treatments effects by political ideology, with 
statistically significant differences between predicted values.   
4.2.3 Satisfaction with Democracy, Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Class 
In addition to political ideology, I also hypothesize that class-status should 
condition the relationship between inequality, fairness perceptions, and political support.  
In Chapter 2, I argue that upper-class individuals should be more likely to draw on 
system legitimizing narratives to justify economic inequality, and that even when upper-
class individuals perceive distributive unfairness, they should still be less likely than 
lower-class individuals to express political dissatisfaction as a result.  To test for 
heterogeneous treatment effects, I turn again to regression analysis.  As before, I estimate 
an OLS regression model in which I use dummy variables for each experimental group 
(excluding the control group as the reference category) to predict satisfaction with 
democracy.  I then interact each of these dummy variables with respondents’ subjective 
social class, and include controls for political ideology, sex, political interest, and 
education.  Models 3 and 4 in Appendix Table C4 show the results from the regression 
models that I used to generate and plot predicted democratic satisfaction for lower-class 
and upper-class individuals in each of the experimental groups.   
For lower-class individuals (subjective social class<3, or about 42 percent of 
respondents), predicted satisfaction is significantly lower compared to the control in each 
treatment mentioning inequality, regardless of whether inequality is framed as unfair or  
94 
 
Figure 4.3 Class, Fairness Perceptions, and Predicted Satisfaction 
 
Note: Point estimated are predicted values from the OLS model in Appendix Table C4.  
Overlapping bars around point estimates indicate that predicted values are not significantly 
different at the 95% confidence level (Julious 2004). 
 
fair.  When just told that inequality is increasing, lower-class participants’ predicted 
satisfaction drops by .49 points compared to the control (difference p<.05).  When told 
that inequality is increasing and that this represents an unfair outcome, predicted 
satisfaction drops by .54 points compared to the control (difference p<.01).  When given 
the opportunity to perceive inequality as a fair distributive outcome, lower-class 
participants’ predicted satisfaction rebounds a bit, but is still .35 points lower than the 
control (difference p=.06).  For middle and upper-class individuals (subjective social 
class ≥ 3, or approximately 58% of respondents), information about inequality, framed as 
either an unfair or fair distributive outcome, has no discernable effect on predicted 
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satisfaction.  As the right panel in Figure 4.3 illustrates, the none of the differences 
between predicted satisfaction in the control group and Treatment 1 (.20 decrease), 
Treatment 2 (.12 decrease), and Treatment 3 (.04 decrease) are significant at conventional 
levels.   
These results are consistent with my expectation that upper-class individuals 
should be less likely to perceive the income distribution as unfair.  And, while I did not 
find support for Hypothesis 2 – that the effect of perceived distributive unfairness will be 
weaker among upper-class than lower-class individuals – in my cross-national analysis, 
the results from this survey do lend support to this hypothesis.  Although I observe a drop 
in predicted satisfaction when all participants are presented with information about 
inequality and distributive unfairness, these differences are much larger (and only 
significant for) the lower-class individuals in the sample.  
4.3 Results from a Survey Experiment in the United States  
In the next two sections, I supplement my experimental results from Argentina 
with results of a similar survey experiment that I previously fielded in Mexico and the 
United States.  The setup of this experiment was the same as in Argentina, with a control 
group and three treatments; however, the wording of vignettes was slightly different in 
the prior experiments.  See Appendix 3 for the exact wording of each treatment from the 
2017 U.S. experiment (in English) and the 2018 Mexico experiment (in Spanish).  Also, 
although the post-treatment question in the Argentina experiment was about satisfaction 
with democracy, the U.S. and Mexico experiments ask about trust in government.  While 
this means that results from these three experiments are not directly comparable, recall 
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from the cross-national analysis that when it comes to the relationship between 
inequality, perceived distributive unfairness, and political support, results were 
remarkable similar whether using trust in government or satisfaction with democracy as a 
dependent variable.    
In March 2017, I administered a survey experiment to roughly 1,500 U.S. 
participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (hereafter referred to as MTurk) platform.  
MTurk samples are increasingly used in the social sciences and they are shown to be just 
as (if not more) representative than other internet-based survey platforms (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, and Gosling 2011), and have been used to replicate a number of well-known 
political science experiments (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012).   
Table 4.2 Trust in Government, Average Treatment Effects, U.S Experiment 
Control Group: Only information about the economy (EI) 
 Trust=2.38 
N=355 
 
Treatment 1: EI+ 
Inequality 
Treatment 2: EI + Inequality + 
Unfair 
Treatment 3: EI + Inequality 
+ Fair 
Trust=2.21 
Difference: -.17** 
N=350 
Trust=2.21 
Difference: -.17** 
N=361 
Trust=2.29 
Difference: -.09 
N=346 
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05. Two-tailed tests of significance. DV: 1-5, 5 = “Always” trust 
T-tests represent a series of comparisons between the control group and each of the treatment 
groups. On average, individuals report significantly lower levels of trust in government 
(compared to the control group) when told that economic inequality is increasing (and that this is 
an unfair outcome).  However, when told that inequality represents a “fair” outcome, average 
levels of trust are indistinguishable from those in the control group, who only receive information 
about the economic recovery.  
 
Table 4.2 shows the average effect for each of the three treatments, compared to 
the control.  On average, people expressed lower levels of trust in government when they 
perceive high inequality, that is, they attribute blame for inequality to the government.  
These results are consistent with my main theoretical argument that perceived distributive 
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unfairness undermines support for the political system.  Compared to people who are 
only told that inequality is increasing (Treatment 1), providing additional information 
about unfairness does not diminish political support.  While this may appear 
counterintuitive, it is in line with my theoretical expectation that perceptions of 
distributive unfairness are causal factors linking inequality to political support. That is to 
say, the lower levels of government trust are the result of people perceiving distributive 
unfairness.  High levels of inequality represent a system in which unfair government 
policies benefit a small group of wealthy citizens at the expense of everyone else.  The 
results from this survey experiment are consistent with themes that emerged from 
qualitative survey data I collected in the US: 
“[The cause of inequality is an] unfair income distribution. Programs that help the 
disadvantaged and the poor being cut to save money and lower taxes, which 
disproportionately helps the wealthy. Fewer and fewer programs being offered to 
help the poor.”  
 
“The government not regulating things properly and taxing people unfairly.” 
 
“Unfair wages matching current inflation. Greedy businessmen who cut corners 
by reducing employee benefits and pay. Rich people not paying their fair share of 
taxes.” 
 
As in the Argentina experiment, providing the extra information in Treatment 2 
does not offer participants any new or conflicting information. However, telling people 
that rising inequality is fair does have an additional effect on political support. People 
receiving Treatment 3 expressed slightly lower levels of trust in government compared to 
the control group, but the difference is not statistically significant (p=.18). Thus, on 
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average, when people are given identical information about economic performance and 
rising inequality, political support does not suffer nearly as much when people are told 
that inequality represents a fair distributive outcome.   
The fact that I observe political support rising when individuals are offered an 
opportunity to perceive economic inequality as fair further supports the notion that 
fairness perceptions are key factors linking high inequality to political dissatisfaction, as 
well as research showing that individuals often rely on system justifying narratives when 
they encounter information about inequality and distributive unfairness (Cassese and 
Holman 2018; Jost et al. 2003; Kay and Jost 2003; Tyler 2006).  Qualitative survey data 
from the US again helps to contextualize this finding.  Responses such as the following 
appeared time and again in response to my open-ended question about the causes of 
economic inequality in the United States: 
“Poor people do not do anything to try and get their children out of poverty.  
(some) Americans are lazy and believe that they can get by without applying 
themselves.” 
“Looking at it from the poor side of people, I think that these poor in our society 
are lazy and complain a lot. They want to be spoon fed and blame everything on 
everyone e.g., government, years of slavery, lack of jobs etc. This is what most 
poor people think and believe. I think if they actually put their mind to it, they 
could pull themselves out of poverty without complaining or blaming anyone. 
That said, some of the rich are taking advantage of the poor in society and pinning 
them down by not paying them well enough even when they publicly announce 
the millions their companies make. I think the gap is so huge because the rich 
have become so greedy and the poor have refused to rise up and get themselves 
out of their predicament. It's really that simple. Thank you.” 
 
These individuals may well recognize that inequality exists in society, and they recognize 
that it can have negative consequences.  However, human nature is largely to blame for 
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growing levels of inequality.  The government is not to blame for inequality, except to 
the extent that it rewards laziness.  If people would simply work harder, they could create 
more economic opportunities for their children and themselves.   
Although the results in Table 4.2 are informative, I am also interested in 
heterogeneous treatment effects by political ideology (Hypothesis 3). As before, I 
estimate baseline model and an interactive models predicting trust in government (see 
Appendix Table C5).  In each model, I include a dummy variable to indicate whether or 
not an individual received each treatment (excluding the control group as the reference 
category).  I also include a measure for political ideology (coded 1-5; 5 = “Very 
Conservative), and I control for class self-identification, education, sex (1 = “Female), 
race (1= “White”; 0 = “Not White”), political interest, and personal economic situation 
(1-5; 5 = “Much worse than a year ago”).  
In order to investigate the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects, I interact 
each of the experimental treatment groups with the political ideology measure.  I then use 
the results from the interactive model to estimate a series of predicted probabilities, given 
different combinations of experimental treatments and political ideology. I calculate and 
plot a series of predicted probabilities in Figure 4.4 to aid in the substantive interpretation 
of the heterogeneous treatment effects.  Since so few individuals indicated that they can 
“always” trust the government, regardless of treatment group, I calculate and plot the 
probability of saying trust “most of the time” (response category 4) in Figure 4.4. Bars 
around the point estimates indicate whether differences between predicted probabilities 
are significant at the 95 percent level. 
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Figure 4.4 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Political Ideology 
 
Note: Point estimates represent the predicted probability that an individual will indicate trust in 
government “most of the time” for individuals on the political left and right.  Overlapping bars 
indicate that predicted probabilities are not significantly different at the 95% CI (Julious 2004). 
 
The first thing to notice in Figure 4.4 is that those on the left and on the right 
respond similarly to Treatment 1.  When told that inequality in the United States is rising, 
participants expressed significantly lower levels of trust compared to those in the control 
group.  Yet, important differences arise regarding the treatments that mention fairness.  
Those on the left receiving Treatment 3 expressed significantly lower levels of trust, 
compared to those in the respective control group.  For those on the right, however, 
individuals receiving the third treatment (inequality + fair outcome) expressed levels of 
trust that are indistinguishable from the control, and significantly higher than individuals 
receiving the first treatment (inequality information only).  For individuals on the right 
receiving Treatment 1, their predicted probability of saying they trust the government 
“most of the time” is only .06, compared to .11 for those receiving Treatment 3.   
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Although I observe political support rising, on average, when people are given the 
opportunity to perceive economic inequality as fair, this finding appears to be driven by 
individuals on the right of the political spectrum.  Recall, I theorized that conservatives, 
or those on the political right, should be the most likely to rely on system justifying 
ideologies and stereotypes in order to come to terms with objectively high levels of 
inequality.  Indeed, these results suggest that individuals on the right are more likely to 
rely on legitimizing ideologies such as the “procedural fairness of the markets” (Tyler 
2006) when forming their perceptions of distributive fairness and subsequent evaluations 
of political support.  The results here also reinforce the finding from Chapter 3 and 
Hypothesis 3 that perceptions of distributive unfairness have less of an impact on political 
support for those on the right, compared to those on the left.      
4.4 Results from a Survey Experiment in Mexico  
In February 2018, I administered a survey with embedded experimental 
manipulations, in Spanish, to roughly 300 undergraduate students at a large university in 
Mexico City.  As with the U.S. experiment, the setup here consisted of a control and three 
treatments.  The exact wording of each vignette can be found in Appendix 2. 
Table 4.3 shows the average effect for each of the three treatments, compared to 
the control for my Mexico survey experiment.  On average, participants expressed lower 
levels of trust in government when they are told that inequality in Mexico is increasing 
(Treatment 1) and that this represents an unfair distributive outcome (Treatment 2).  
These results lend additional support for Hypothesis 1. Moreover, compared to 
participants who are only told that inequality in Mexico is increasing (Treatment 1), 
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providing additional information about distributive unfairness does not significantly 
diminish political support further.   
Table 4.3  Average Treatment Effects, Mexico Distributive Fairness Experiment  
 Control Group 
ATE=2.00 
N=57 
 
Treatment 1 
Inequality 
Information 
ATE=1.77 
N=78 
Difference= -.23* 
Treatment 2 
Inequality Information + 
Unfair 
ATE=1.74 
N=72 
Difference= -.26* 
Treatment 3 
Inequality Information + 
Fair 
ATE=1.97 
N=61 
Difference= -.03 
Note: *p<.05,  two-tailed t-tests with unequal variance comparing each treatment to the control 
group. When presented with information about increasing inequality and/or distributive 
unfairness, participants indicate significantly lower levels of trust in government compared to 
individuals who only received information about the economy. 
   
This finding supports my theory that perceptions of distributive unfairness are the 
causal mechanisms linking economic inequality to political support.  That is, lower levels 
of trust in government, in a context of rising inequality, are the result of people 
perceiving distributive unfairness, and providing the extra information in Treatment 2 
does not offer participants any new or conflicting information. Yet, telling participants 
that rising inequality in Mexico represents a fair distributive outcome does affect political 
support differently, compared to only telling people that inequality is on the rise.  In fact, 
participants receiving Treatment 3 expressed levels of trust in government that were 
nearly identical to participants in the control group who received no information about 
inequality.   Stated differently, on average, when people are given identical information 
about the economy and income inequality, political support does not suffer when rising 
inequality is framed as a fair distributive outcome.  The fact that I observe political trust 
rising when individuals are offered an opportunity to perceive economic inequality as fair 
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further supports the notion that perceptions of distributive unfairness are important causal 
factors linking high inequality to political dissatisfaction.  
Turning one final time to my hypothesis about the conditioning effect of political 
ideology, Table 4.4 present the average treatment effects for each treatment and control 
group, broken down by ideological subsamples.  As in the Argentina survey, I measure 
political ideology using the same 0 to 10 left-right scale.  For this analysis, I classify 
participants who placed themselves between 0 and 4 on the scale as “left-leaning,” and 
between 6 and 10 as “right-leaning.”  Turning first to the left-leaning participants in the 
top of Table 4.4, I show that the average treatment effects are all in a similar direction as 
those for the entire sample.  Participants receiving Treatments 1 and 2 all express 
significantly lower levels of trust in government, compared to the control.  Participants 
receiving Treatment 3 expressed slightly lower levels of trust compared to the control, 
but the difference is not statistically significant (p<.05).  Although the difference between 
treatments and the control for those on the left are all in the same direction, compared to 
the full sample, the negative effect of perceived distributive unfairness is much stronger 
for left-leaning respondents, as evident by the larger magnitude of the effect size (-.34 
and -.43 for left-respondents compared to -.23 and -.26 for the full sample).   
Turning to right-leaning participants on the bottom of Table 4.4, I show a number 
of important differences compared to left-leaning participants.  First, the magnitude of the 
effect sizes for each Treatments 1 and 2 are much smaller than they are for those on the 
left, or for the sample as a whole.  Indeed, the differences between Treatments 1 and 2 are 
statistically indistinguishable from the control.  Although any statistically significant 
results are difficult to detect with such a small sample size, power analysis indicates that I 
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would need roughly 1,100 participants in each treatment group (total N=4,400) to observe 
the even largest effect size as significant.   
Table 4.4 Average Treatment Effects by Political Ideology, Mexico Experiment 
Left-Leaning Participants (Ideology=0-4) 
 Control Group 
ATE=1.97 
N=35 
 
Treatment 1 
Inequality 
Information 
ATE=1.63 
N=44 
Difference= -.34* 
Treatment 2 
Inequality Information + 
Unfair 
ATE=1.54 
N=37 
Difference= -.43* 
Treatment 3 
Inequality Information+ 
Fair 
ATE=1.75 
N=28 
Difference= -.19 
Right-Leaning Participants (Ideology=6-10) 
 Control Group 
ATE=2.08 
N=12 
 
Treatment 1 
Inequality 
Information 
ATE=2.05 
N=19 
Difference= -.03 
Treatment 2 
Inequality Information + 
Unfair 
ATE=2.00 
N=17 
Difference= -.08 
Treatment 3 
Inequality Information+ 
Fair 
ATE=2.18 
N=16 
Difference= .10 
*p<.05, two-tailed t-tests with unequal variance comparing each treatment to the control group. 
The panel on the top shows average treatment effects for the left-leaning (ideology=0-4) 
subsample.  Average treatment effects for the right-leaning (ideology=6-10) subsample are on the 
bottom. 
 
The second thing to notice for right-leaning participants is that the average 
treatment effect for Treatment 3, where inequality is framed as a fair distributive 
outcome, is actually larger compared to the control group.  Again, although it is difficult 
to detect statistically significant differences with such small samples, I also observe a 
similar effect among conservative respondents in the U.S. version of this survey, with a 
much larger sample size.  Give the same finding in the U.S. and Argentina, I am more 
confident that the results for my right-leaning participants in the Mexico sample are not 
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the result of chance.  Together, these finding lends support to Hypothesis 3, and they 
bolster the finding from my cross-national analysis that the effect of perceived 
distributive unfairness on trust is stronger for those on the left than those on the right. 
Moreover, the results from the right-leaning subsample suggest that, consistent with my 
theory, those on the right are more likely to rely on legitimizing ideologies such as the 
“procedural fairness of the free market” (Tyler 2006) when forming their perceptions of 
distributive fairness and subsequent evaluations of political support, and they reinforce 
the finding from Chapter 3 (H3) that perceptions of distributive unfairness have less of an 
impact on political support for those on the right, compared to those on the left.  
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used original survey experiments from Argentina, Mexico, and 
the United States to isolate the impact of information and inequality and distributive 
(un)fairness on support for the political system.  Results from these survey experiments 
demonstrate that when inequality is framed as an unfair distributive outcome, satisfaction 
with democracy suffers.  Yet, framing economic inequality as a fair distributive outcome 
mitigates its negative impact on democratic satisfaction.  This finding is consistent with 
my main theoretical argument in Chapter 2, as well as with the cross-national relationship 
highlighted in Chapter 3, that perceptions of distributive unfairness are negatively and 
significantly associated with support for the political system. 
 Results from these survey experiments also reinforce my theoretical argument that 
economic inequality and fairness perceptions impact political support differently 
depending up individuals’ political ideology and class status.  Turning first to 
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individuals’ subjective social class, results from the regression analyses reveal that the 
negative impact of inequality and perceived distributive unfairness is most acute among 
lower-class individuals.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, however, information about 
economic inequality and distributive unfairness has a negligible impact on democratic 
satisfaction among individuals in the upper strata of society.   
With regard to political ideology, the negative effect of information about 
inequality on satisfaction with democracy was larger for those on the political left 
compared to the right.  And moreover, left-leaning individuals were not swayed by 
attempts to frame inequality as a fair distributive outcome.  When told that inequality is 
increasing, regardless of whether framed as an unfair or fair distributive outcome, left-
leaning individuals’ satisfaction with democracy declines by about 13 percent. For 
individuals on the political right, however, information about inequality and distributive 
unfairness have a more muted effect on satisfaction with democracy.  And, when given 
the opportunity to view inequality as a fair distributive outcome, right-leaning individuals 
express levels of democratic satisfaction that are comparable to the control condition that 
does not mention inequality at all.  Taken together, these findings are consistent with 
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and 
political support will be weakest among right-leaning individuals. 
The fact that I observed stronger heterogenous treatment effects by political 
ideology in the United States than in Argentina does suggest that left-right ideological 
placement may work differently in Argentina compared to the U.S.  Recall in Chapter 2 
that I drew on three strands of literature to develop my hypothesis about the conditioning 
role of political ideology (H3): moral foundations of political ideology, economic 
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discourse about the role of the state in the economy, and system justification.  Although 
survey data presented in Chapter 1 suggests that citizens in Argentina overwhelming 
believe the state should enact firm policies to reduce inequality, system justifying 
ideologies about inequality may not map onto left-right semantics in Argentina as well as 
they do in the United States.    
My aim with the experiments in this chapter was to hold information about 
inequality constant, within the context of single-country studies, so that I could isolate the 
causal impact of fairness perceptions on satisfaction with democracy and trust in 
government.  The average treatment effects from this experiment suggest that perceived 
distributive unfairness is one mechanism whereby inequality reduces support for the 
political system.  If economic inequality and perceived distributive unfairness were 
unrelated phenomena that independently impact support for the political system, then we 
should expect that providing information about both of these things should have a 
compound negative effect on democratic satisfaction.  This is not what we observe.  In a 
context of rising inequality, telling people that the income distribution is unfair does not 
provide any new or conflicting information, on average.  Yet, when individuals are given 
the opportunity to reevaluate their perceptions of the income distributive and view 
inequality through a lens of distributive unfairness, their support for the political system 
rebounds. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. AN EXPERIMENT ON INEQUALITY, CORRUPTION, AND 
POLITICAL SUPPORT  
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I developed a theoretical argument that in a context of good 
governance, individuals should be less likely to perceive economic inequality as unfair, 
and less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result of perceived distributive 
unfairness.  The cross-national analysis in Chapter 3 was consistent with this argument.  
When looking across Latin America, the negative relationship between perceived 
distributive unfairness and different indicators of political support is weakest in a context 
of good governance.  In other words, in a context of good governance – as indicated by 
low levels of corruption – individuals may well perceive their country’s income 
distribution to be unfair, but the presence of good governance mitigates the negative 
relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and support for the political 
system. 
 In this chapter, I use an original survey experiment in Argentina to isolate the 
causal effect of governance quality on the relationship between inequality and support for 
the political system.  This experiment was also embedded in the online survey described 
at the beginning of Chapter 4.  All participants not assigned to take part in the experiment 
described in the previous chapter were assigned to take part in this experiment.  In total, 
1,577 participants from the online Netquest panel were assigned to receive one of the 
treatments in this experiment.  After excluding participants who failed a manipulation 
check question later in the survey, the resulting sample size was N=624.  As before, the 
analysis in this chapter is only based on the subsample of participants who answered the 
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manipulation check question correctly. I include the average treatment effects for the full 
sample in Appendix Tables D3 to D5.24 
 My aim in designing the treatments for the present survey experiment was to hold 
information about economic inequality constant, within the context of a single-country 
study, and to vary information about two forms of corruption: bribery and theft of public 
resources.  Although the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 employed a broad measure of 
governance quality that relies on expert perceptions of corruption, corruption can take 
many forms, including bribery and outright theft (Desierto 2019), and its scope ranges 
from petty corruption, generally on the part of low-level civil servants, to grand 
corruption orchestrated by high-level public officials (Bauhr 2017; Graycar and Villa 
2011).   
In a context of high inequality, there is good reason to expect that corruption, an 
important indicator of governance quality and procedural justice, shapes citizens’ 
judgments about distributive fairness and their subsequent evaluations of the political 
system.  Corruption-as-theft reduces the overall level of public resources that are 
necessary to successfully enact pro-egalitarian social welfare programs.  And, although 
corruption-as-bribery does not diminish the total amount of public goods available for 
redistribution, it challenges societal norms about equality of opportunity: “Even in cases 
when governments cannot immediately reduce inequality, they can enact policies that 
offer greater opportunities for economic equality” (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, 47).  As 
an advisor to a National Deputy in Argentina noted, however, “The state is promoting 
                                                 
24 Results discussed in this section do not hold when participants who failed the 
manipulation check are included in the analysis.   
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lots of policies and projects to reduce inequality, but resources like houses and money 
aren’t being given to the right people; they’re in the wrong hands because of 
corruption.”25  When programs meant to reduce inequality are not administered 
impartially, the democratic government is not affording all citizens equal opportunities 
for economic progress, and hence citizens should be more likely to express political 
dissatisfaction for what they perceive as an unfair economic distribution. 
5.2 Experimental Design 
Individuals participating in this survey experiment were randomly assigned to 
read one of six vignettes.  They read that the incidence of [bribery/theft of public 
resources] in Argentina has [remained the same/increased/decreased] in recent years, and 
at the same time, the gap between the rich and poor in Argentina continues to grow 
wider.  The exact Spanish wording of each vignette can be found in Appendix Table D2.  
After presenting participants with one of these six vignettes, I then asked post treatment 
questions about satisfaction with democracy, trust in government, and perceptions of 
distributive fairness. 
Satisfaction with democracy: With this in mind, how satisfied are you with the 
functioning of democracy in Argentina?  Are you very dissatisfied (coded 1), 
dissatisfied (2), neither dissatisfied nor satisfied (3), satisfied (4), or very satisfied 
(5)? 
 
Trust in government: And how much trust do you have in the national 
government?  Do you trust it not at all (coded 1), a little (2), somewhat (3), or a 
lot (4)? 
 
                                                 
25 Author interview, June 2018. 
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Perceptions of distributive unfairness: And how fair do you think the income 
distribution is in Argentina?  Do you believe it’s very fair (coded 1), fair (2), 
unfair (3), or very unfair (4)? 
 
Later in the survey, I asked all participants a manipulation check question: “In a 
previous question, you read that corruption in Argentina has remained the same (coded 
1), increased (2), or decreased (3).  As mentioned above, only about 40 percent of 
participants in this experiment answered the manipulation check question correctly.  The 
results discussed in the following sections are based on this subset of participations 
Appendix Tables D3 to D5 show the average treatment effects for the full sample.  
Appendix Tables D1 shows the sample characteristics for the full and reduced samples, 
as well as each treatment group.  Finally, Appendix Tables D6 and D7 show the results 
from a multinomial logit predicting assignment to each treatment group. 
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Inequality, Corruption, and Satisfaction with Democracy 
 In the next two sections, I use these experimental data to investigate the 
relationship between economic inequality, governance quality, and support for the 
political system.  Although not a direct test of Hypothesis 4 – that good governance will 
mitigate the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on political support – 
I take as my starting point in this experiment the assumption that most individuals will 
perceive increasing inequality as an unfair distributive outcome.  Indeed, results from my 
cross-national analysis In Chapter 3, as well as the survey experiment ion Chapter 4, are 
consistent with this assumption.  If my theoretical argument about inequality, governance 
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quality, and political support is correct, then an observable implication of this argument is 
that given the same information about inequality, individuals should be more satisfied 
with democracy when corruption is decreasing, and less satisfied when corruption is 
increasing.  
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show that average treatment effect, or average response 
to the post-treatment question about satisfaction with democracy, for each experimental 
group.  Turning first to the participants who read about corruption-as-theft, the average 
satisfaction with democracy response in the control group was 2.65, the same as the 
baseline group that received no information about corruption or inequality.  When 
individuals read that both inequality and theft of public resources in Argentina have been 
increasing in recent years, the average satisfaction response declines by .27 points to 2.38 
(difference significant at p=.06 compared to the control).   
Table 5.1 Average Treatment Effects, Satisfaction with Democracy 
Baseline Satisfaction  
w/Democracy=2.65 
 Theft of Resources  
Same 
ATE=2.65 
N=93 
Increasing 
ATE=2.38 
N=117 
Diff= -.27* 
Decreasing 
ATE=3.22 
N=85 
Diff= .57*** 
 Bribery  
Same 
ATE=2.39 
N=95 
Increasing 
ATE=2.25 
N=139 
Diff= -.14 
Decreasing 
ATE=2.91 
N=95 
Diff=.53*** 
Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” treatments to 
the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
DV: Satisfaction with democracy 1= “Very Dissatisfied” to 5= “Very satisfied” 
 
Given the same information about rising inequality, however, the average 
response to the question about satisfaction with democracy increases compared to the 
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baseline and the control by .57 points to 3.22.  The difference between the “theft 
decreasing” and “theft increasing” experimental groups is perhaps even more impressive.  
Given the same information about increasing inequality, which the cross-national results 
in Chapter 3 consistently show is associated with perceived distributive unfairness, 
participants’ satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is .85 points higher (35 
percent high) when they read that corruption is decreasing rather than increasing.  This 
finding is consistent with my theoretical expectations about how governance quality 
mitigates the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on support for the 
political system.  And moreover, this finding has important implications for democratic 
stability and consolidation, which I discuss later.   
Turning next to the corruption-as-bribery treatments, Table 5.1 shows a similar 
pattern to the corruption-as-theft groups.  Compared to the control group who read that 
incidence of bribery have remained unchanged in recent years at the same time that 
inequality is increasing, participants who read that both bribery and inequality were on 
the rise indicated an average level of satisfaction with democracy equal to 2.25, or 
slightly higher than “dissatisfied.”  The difference in average treatment effects between 
the control group and the “bribery increasing” group (-.14), however, is not significantly 
different from 0 at conventional levels of significance (p=.31).  A post-experiment power 
analysis reveals that to observe this difference as statistically significant (p<.05), I would 
have needed nearly 900 respondents per experimental group, well above the total number 
in either the reduced sample of participants who answered the manipulation check 
question correctly, or in the full sample which averaged about 250 respondents per 
experimental group. 
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Figure 5.1 Inequality, Corruption, and Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ATE is different from the respective “corruption same” group.   
DV: How satisfied are you with the way democracy functions? 1=V. dissatisfied, 5=V. satisfied. 
 The difference in average treatment effects between the control group and the 
group reading that inequality is increasing but incidences of bribery are declining, 
however, is statistically significant (p<.01) and in the expected direction.  Indeed, this 
.53-point increase in satisfaction with democracy is quite similar to that observed among 
the corruption-as-theft participants.  Also, compared to participants who read that both 
bribery and inequality are increasing, participants who received the same information 
about inequality but read that bribery is decreasing, satisfaction with democracy is .66 
points higher, a roughly 30 percent and statistically significant (p<.01) increase.  And 
again, these results consistent with my theoretical expectation that good governance (as 
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evidenced by declining levels of corruption) will mitigate the negative impact of 
inequality and perceived distributive unfairness on support for the political system. 
 Finally, comparing the differences between the two “corruption decreasing” and 
“corruption increasing” treatment effects suggests that when it comes to the relationship 
between inequality and satisfaction with democracy, theft of public resources has a 
stronger moderating effect on the relationship than bribery.  As noted above, bribery 
challenges societal norms about the equality of opportunity, but theft of public resources 
directly hinders governments’ ability to enact pro-egalitarian reforms.  Indeed, the 
increase in satisfaction with democracy that results from moving from the respective 
“corruption increasing” to the “corruption decreasing” treatment groups is .19 points 
greater for the participants who read about theft of public resources compared to those 
who read about bribery (differences significant p<.01). 
5.3.2 Inequality, Corruption, and Trust in Government 
In addition to satisfaction with democracy, I also asked participants in this 
experiment a post-treatment question about trust in government.  Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 
show the average treatment effects for participants in each experimental group.  The 
patterns in average treatment effects for the trust in government question are similar to 
those for satisfaction with democracy, although the differences are not directly 
comparable because the trust question uses a 4-point response scale, whereas the 
satisfaction question uses a 5-point scale.  Nevertheless, the pattern displayed in Table 
5.2 and Figure 5.2 is again consistent with my argument that good governance mitigates 
the negative influence of inequality and perceived distributive unfairness on support for 
the political system. 
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Table 5.2 Average Treatment Effects, Trust in Government 
 Theft of Resources  
Same 
ATE=2.16 
N=93 
Increasing 
ATE=1.62 
N=117 
Diff= -.54*** 
Decreasing 
ATE=3.13 
N=85 
Diff= .97*** 
 Bribery  
Same 
ATE=2.03 
N=95 
Increasing 
ATE=1.84 
N=139 
Diff= -.18 
Decreasing 
ATE=2.67 
N=95 
Diff= .64*** 
Note: Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” 
treatments to the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
DV: Trust in government 1= “none” to 4= “a lot” 
 
Turning first to the top panel in Table 5.2, when individuals read that theft of 
public resources in Argentina has remained unchanged in recent years at the same time 
that inequality is increasing, the average response to the question, “How much do you 
trust the National Government” was 2.16 on a 1 to 4 scale, or slightly above “a little.”  
When participants read that both corruption-as-theft and economic inequality have been 
increasing in recent years, their average level of trust in government declines .54 points to 
1.62 (difference from control is significant p<.01), or between “none” and “a little” trust.  
When told that inequality is increasing but theft of resources is declining, the average 
response to the trust in government question, compared to the control, increases nearly 
one full scale point (difference from control is significant p<.01) to 3.13, between “some” 
and “a lot” of trust.  Comparing the “theft increasing” to the “theft decreasing” average 
responses, the differences are even more striking.  Given the same exact information and 
increasing inequality, the average trust in government response is more than 1.5 points – 
on a 4-point scale – when participants learn that corruption is decreasing compared to 
when it is increasing.  This is again consistent with my theoretical argument that good 
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governance should mitigate the negative influence of inequality, and resulting 
perceptions of distributive unfairness, on political support.     
Figure 5.2 Inequality, Corruption, and Trust in Government 
 
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ATE is different from the respective “corruption same” group.   
 
The patterns in the bottom panel of Table 5.2 are also similar to the satisfaction 
with democracy results in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1.  When told that inequality is 
increasing and incidence of bribetaking have remained unchanged in recent years, the 
average trust response is 2.03, or “a little.”  When told both inequality and bribery are 
increasing, trust in government declines to 1.85, although the difference compared to the 
control is not significant at conventional levels (p=.11).  The average level of trust in 
government is 2.67 for participants reading that inequality is increasing but incidences of 
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bribery are on the decline, compared to 2.03 for those in the control group.  This 
represent a .64 point increase in trust that is significantly different from the control 
(p<.01).  And again, the largest differences in average treatment effects is between the 
“bribery decreasing” and “bribery increasing” groups.  Given the same information about 
rising inequality, the average level of trust in government is .82 points higher (p<.01) 
when participants are told that bribery is decreasing, compared to when they are told 
bribery is increasing. 
5.3.3 Inequality, Corruption, and Perceived Distributive Unfairness  
I do not develop explicit hypotheses in Chapter 2 about how economic inequality 
and governance quality affect the formation of perceptions of distributive unfairness.  
Nevertheless, a key part of the theoretical argument leading up to Hypothesis 4, and an 
implication of literature on fairness and procedural justice theories (e.g., André and 
Depauw 2017; Córdova and Layton 2016), is that individuals should draw on multiple 
sources of information when forming their perceptions of distributive fairness.  Thus, 
good governance should lead people to respond less negatively to inequality in the first 
place.  To assess support for this part of my argument, I also included a post-treatment 
question about perceptions of the fairness of the income distribution in Argentina.  If this 
part of my theoretical argument is correct, then in a context of rising inequality, 
individuals should be less likely to say the income distribution is unfair when they are 
presented with information about good governance, compared to a situation in which 
governance quality remains unchanged or actually gets worse.   
Table 5.3 shows the average treatment effects, or mean response to the post-
treatment question about perceived distributive unfairness in Argentina.  Recall that this 
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question is coded such that 1 indicates “very fair” and 4 indicated “very unfair.”  The 
average treatment effects in Table 5.3 are generally consistent with the fairness and 
procedural justice literature that I draw on in Chapter 2 to develop Hypothesis 4, although 
theft of public resources and bribery clearly influence perceived distributive unfairness 
differently. 
 Turning first to the vignettes that provide information about theft of public 
resources, when told that amount of corruption has remained unchanged in recent years at 
the same time that inequality is increasing (control), the average response to the question 
about perceived distributive unfairness is 3.25. (between “unfair” and “very unfair”).  
When told that both theft of public resources and inequality are increasing, the average 
response inches closer to “very unfair” by .14 points, although the difference between 
this mean response and the control is statistically insignificant at conventional levels 
(p=.11).  When told that theft of public resources is decreasing, however, participants 
indicated that the income distribution is .35 points fairer compared to the control group 
that received similar information about rising inequality (p<.01). 
Table 5.3 Average Treatment Effects, Perceived Distributive Unfairness 
 Theft of Resources  
Same 
ATE=3.25 
N=93 
Increasing 
ATE=3.39 
N=117 
Diff= .14 
Decreasing 
ATE=2.89 
N=85 
Diff= -.35*** 
 Bribery  
Same 
ATE=3.16 
N=95 
Increasing 
ATE=3.50 
N=139 
Diff= .34*** 
Decreasing 
ATE=3.13 
N=95 
Diff= -.03 
Note: Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” 
treatments to the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
DV: How fair is the income distribution in Argentina? 1= “very fair” to 4= “very unfair” 
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 Turning next to the bribery vignettes, Table 5.3 show a similar pattern to the theft 
vignettes.  Compared to individuals who are told that inequality is increasing and that 
incidence of bribery have remained the same in recent years, participants indicate that the 
income distribution in Argentina is more unfair when told that incidence of bribery are 
increasing, and that the income distribution is fairer when instance of bribery are 
declining.  Unlike in the “theft of resources” vignettes, however, the significant 
difference from the control group is for the “bribery” increasing treatment, with these 
participants indicating that the income distribution is .34 points more unfair compared to 
the control. 
Figure 5.3 shows the average treatment effects from Table 5.3 graphically.  The 
results in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.3 are wholly consistent with prior research on the Fair 
Process Effect (e.g., Tyler & van der Toorn, 2013; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & 
Vermunt, 1998), which implies that the relationship between inequality and perceived 
distributive unfairness should be weaker in a context of good governance than one of 
poor governance.  In both sets of experiments, participants are the most likely to say that 
the income distribution in their country is unfair when inequality and corruption are 
simultaneously on the increase.  Given the same context of rising inequality, however, 
participants are significantly less likely to say that the income distribution is unfair when 
corruption is declining, an indication that governance quality is better (i.e., the difference 
between the corruption increasing and corruption decreasing treatments is significantly 
different p<.001). 
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Figure 5.3 Inequality, Corruption, and Perceived Distributive Unfairness  
 
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ATE is different from the respective “corruption same” group.  The 
difference between each corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” groups is significant (p<.01) as 
well. DV: Howe fair is the income distribution in Argentina? 1=Very Fair, 4=Very Unfair. 
5.4 Discussion Conclusion 
 In this section, I discussed the results from an original survey experiment in 
Argentina in which I isolated the effect of corruption – the main indicator of governance 
quality that I use in this dissertation – on support for the political system.  First, I showed 
that given identical information about rising inequality, individuals are less likely to say 
the income distribution is unfair when corruption is decreasing, as opposed to increasing 
or remaining unchanged.  Although I did not develop hypotheses about the relationship 
between inequality and individuals’ perceptions of the income distribution in Chapter 2, 
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the findings in this survey experiment are consistent with a large body of literature on 
social justice and fairness theories.  In particular, research on the Fair Process Effect 
(e.g., Tyler & van der Toorn, 2013; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998) 
suggests that governance quality should shape people’s expectations about the outcomes 
they receive and their responses to any distributive unfairness they may experience. 
 Results from this survey experiment also show that governance quality conditions 
the relationship between inequality and individuals’ support for the political system.  
Given identical information about rising inequality in Argentina, participants in this 
experiment expressed higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in 
government when they read that bribery and the theft of public resources have been on 
the decline in recent years, compared to those who read that corruption has been 
increasing or remaining constant.   
While this finding is not an exact test of Hypotheses 4, that governance quality 
should mitigate the negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and 
political support, it is largely consistent with my theoretical arguments leading up to this 
hypothesis.  Both cross-national survey data and qualitative data from the U.S. and 
Argentina support the assumption that most individuals view inequality through a lens of 
distributive unfairness, and that they attribute blame for this perceived unfair outcome to 
the government.  In a context of good governance, the negative effect of inequality, and 
by extension perceptions of unfairness, is significantly reduced.     
One limitation of this study is that I am not able to assess how different 
combinations of inequality and governance information affect support for the political 
system.  The results discussion above assumes that the combination of good governance 
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and decreasing inequality should have the most positive impact on individuals’ political 
evaluations, but I am not actually able to test this part of the argument with my 
experimental design.  Indeed, it is possible that individuals in Argentina care more about 
corruption than inequality, and that improvements or shortcomings in governance quality 
outweigh any information about inequality, at least when it comes to satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in government.  Although my theoretical arguments developed in 
Chapter 2 do not suggest that this should be the case, I cannot assess this part of the 
argument empirically at the current time.    
 The empirical results in this chapter advance prior scholarly work on the topic of 
inequality and political support.  Prior research has demonstrated a robust cross-national 
correlation between economic inequality and satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and 
Singer 2008) and political trust (Cordova and Layton 2016; Zmerli and Castillo 2015).  
Results from this survey experiment shed new light on the specific contexts under which 
inequality can be expected to reduce trust with the political system.  That good 
governance, such as declining levels of corruption, can offset the negative influence of 
inequality on support for democratic institutions has important implications for both 
policy and democratic stability more generally in the Americas.  I discuss these broader 
implications in more detail in the final chapter of this dissertation.   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
Political support, such as satisfaction with democracy and trust in government, is 
at troubling low levels and has been steadily declining during the last decade in a number 
of countries throughout the Americas.  In Brazil, for instance, recent high-profile 
corruption scandals coupled with a severe economic recession have left citizens 
disillusioned with their democratic institutions.26 Conversely, while systematic corruption 
in Latin America continues to “widen and deepen social fissures, exacerbate inequality, 
and impede the efficacy of both public and private investment,” recent efforts to crack 
down on corruption in Argentina have been accompanied by a modest uptick in 
institutional trust (World Economic Forum 2018, 7). Prior research has linked 
dissatisfaction and disenchantment with democratic institutions to weak state capacity 
and poor governance (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Kumlin and Esaisson 2012; 
Mainwaring 2006; Weitz-Shapiro 2008), legislative gridlock (Singh and Carlin 2015), 
and economic inequality (Anderson and Singer 2008). I advance these scholarly lines of 
inquiry by using a mixed-methods approach to examine the conditions under which 
inequalities in society translate into political dissatisfaction.   
6.1 Summary of the Argument and Main Findings 
 In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I developed a theoretical argument that 
perceptions of distributive unfairness are key factors whereby inequalities in society 
                                                 
26 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-brazil-nostalgia-grows-for-
the-dictatorship--not-the-brutality-but-the-law-and-order/2018/03/14/bc58ded2-1cdd-
11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7fe0436d084 
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translate into political dissatisfaction.  Extreme inequality challenges citizens’ normative 
expectations about the outcomes that democracy is supposed to deliver in practice (Singh 
and Carlin 2015; Meltzer and Richards 1981).  When individuals view inequality as an 
unfair outcome resulting from the (in)action of democratic government, their political 
support is likely to suffer.  In addition to my expectation that all individuals should be 
less satisfied with democracy and less likely to trust the government when they perceive 
high levels of distributive unfairness in society, I also expect that certain groups of 
individuals – i.e., upper-class citizens and those on the right of the political spectrum – 
are more likely to “cognitively adjust” to or rationalize inequality (Jost et al. 2003, Tyler 
2006), and hence should be less likely to blame the government for any perceived 
distributive unfairness they experience.  Additionally, I developed an argument that 
governance quality should mitigate the negative influence of perceived distributive 
unfairness on political support, albeit for different reasons than the individual-level 
factors that condition this relationship.  In a context of good governance, as evidenced by 
low corruption, for example, citizens are presented with alternative evidence that the 
democratic process is functioning properly. Individuals may well perceive the income 
distribution to be unfair, but the presence of good governance should signal to citizens 
that democracy is nevertheless the most legitimate vehicle for addressing inequality. 
To test my expectations, used a mixed-methods approach and leveraged large-N 
cross-national survey data and original survey experiments.  Table 6.1 summarizes the 
support for each hypothesis offered by each empirical component of the dissertation. In 
Chapter 3, I used a multilevel analysis of Latinobarometer survey data from 18 Latin 
American countries between 2011 and 2015 to test the hypotheses I developed in Chapter 
126 
 
2.  Consistent with my main theoretical argument and Hypothesis 1, I found that 
perceptions of distributive unfairness were significantly and negatively correlated with 
both satisfaction with democracy and trust in government.   
Table 6.1 Summary of Empirical Support for Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Ch. 
 3 
Ch.  
4 
Ch. 
5 
H1: On average, citizens who perceive the distribution of 
income in their country as unfair will express lower levels of 
political support than individuals who view the income 
distribution as fair. 
Yes Yes  
H2: The negative relationship between perceived distributive 
unfairness and political support will be weakest among upper-
class individuals. 
 Partial  
H3: The negative relationship between perceived distributive 
unfairness and political support will be weakest among right-
leaning individuals. 
Partial Partial  
H4: Good governance will weaken the negative relationship 
between perceived distributive unfairness and political support.  
Yes  Yes 
 
Although I did not find support for my expectation that individuals’ class status 
should condition the relationship between fairness perceptions and political support (H2), 
I did find partial support for my argument that being on the right of the political spectrum 
(H3) should weaken the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on 
political support.  Hypothesis 3 was supported to the extent that when it comes to 
satisfaction with democracy and trust in government, fairness judgments simply matter 
less for those on the right of the political spectrum compared to the left.  That the 
satisfaction and trust gaps between those who view the income distribution as “fair” 
compared to “unfair” narrows considerably on the right of the ideological spectrum is 
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consistent with research on the moral foundations of political ideology, which posits that 
liberals are more likely than conservatives to moralize outcomes that they perceive as 
unfair or harmful to others.  However, the fact that predicted political support among 
individuals who perceive the income distribution as “very unfair” is the same across the 
political spectrum challenges my argument that right-leaning individuals rely on system 
justifying narratives when making political evaluations about inequality and distributive 
unfairness, at least in Latin America.  Finally, results from my cross-national analysis 
were wholly consistent with my argument that good governance should mitigate the 
negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on support for the political system 
(H4).   
 In Chapter 4, I used a original survey experiments in Argentina, Mexico, and the 
United States to isolate the causal effects of distributive (un)fairness on political support.  
Given identical information about rising inequality, individuals were much more 
supportive of the political system when inequality was framed as a fair distributive 
outcome.  When participants were told that rising inequality represents an unfair 
distributive outcome, their satisfaction with democracy and trust in government declined, 
but to the same low level as participants who received information about inequality but 
no unfairness frame.  This finding suggests that, consistent with my main theoretical 
argument, inequality leads to political dissatisfaction because individuals view inequality 
as an unfair distributive outcome resulting from the inaction of democratic government.  
Telling individuals that inequality is unfair does not provide them with any new or 
conflicting information.  When using a system-justifying narrative to reframe inequality 
as a fair outcome, however, political support in the face of inequality rebounds.  The 
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main analysis in Chapter 4 centered around a survey experiment I conducted in Argentina 
in February 2019.  However, the fact that I find similar results across time and in Mexico 
as well as the United States speaks to the generalizability and external validity of my 
findings. 
 In Chapter 5, I turned to a second original survey experiment that I fielded in 
Argentina to examine how different forms of corruption – the main indicator of 
governance quality that I use in this dissertation – affect the relationship between 
inequality and political support.  While not a direct test of the hypotheses I developed in 
Chapter 2, insights from qualitative survey data and the experiment in Chapter 4 lend 
support to my assumption that when presented with information about rising inequality, 
most individuals will perceive it to be an unfair distributive outcome.  Results from 
Chapter 5 are consistent with my argument that good governance mitigates the negative 
influence of inequality and perceived distributive unfairness on support for the political 
system.  Given identical information about rising inequality, participants indicated 
significantly higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in government when 
they learn that corruption is decreasing rather than increasing or remaining unchanged.  
That good governance is able to mitigate the negative influence of distributive injustice 
on support for the political system has important policy implications for countries in 
Latin America, where inequality is persistent and higher than any other region in the 
world.   
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6.2 Contributions  
This dissertation contributes to the literature on inequality and political support in 
two important ways, and beyond its theoretical and empirical contributions, has a number 
of broader implications for policy and democratic stability. One important contribution of 
this dissertation is that I investigate factors giving rise to the frequently documented 
connection between economic outcomes and political support.  Although prior research 
has demonstrated a robust empirical correlation between economic inequality and support 
for the political system (e.g., Anderson and Singer 2008; Córdova and Seligson 2010; 
Córdova and Layton 2016; Krieckhaus et al. 2014; Zmerli and Castillo 2015), this 
research has yet to fully unpack the psychological mechanisms linking aggregate-level 
inequality to individual-level evaluations of democracy.  In this dissertation, I argue that 
individuals’ perceptions of distributive fairness are key to understanding the previously 
documented correlation between inequality and political support.  Empirically, I use a 
combination of observational and original experimental research methods to test this 
theoretical argument. 
Another contribution is that I draw upon social justice theories to derive new 
hypotheses about how people formulate fairness judgments and use these judgments to 
evaluate democratic governments.  Specifically, I apply social psychology research on 
social justice and fairness theories to the study of political support and shows that citizens 
rely on information about distributive fairness (i.e., the fairness of economic outcomes) as 
well as noneconomic information about government policies and procedures, when 
evaluating the political system. 
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Beyond these theoretical contributions, my findings have a number of broader 
implications for policy and democratic stability.  Given the tenuous levels of political 
support in countries suffering from high inequality, such as those in Latin America, 
understanding why inequality reduces political support is key to finding ways to restore 
trust in government and satisfaction with democracy.  
6.3 Broader Implications 
Poverty and distributive unfairness are widespread problems that have the 
potential to undermine not only support for the political system, but also political 
engagement and participation (Holzner, 2010; Solt, 2008). People care a great deal about 
fairness, and when they perceive patently unfair outcomes, such as an unfair distribution 
of wealth or income, they are less likely to be satisfied with their democratic government.  
On the one hand, this may be troubling for the prospects of democratic consolidation in 
regions such as the Americas: despite some recent declines in inequality, citizens across 
Latin America overwhelmingly perceive their countries’ income distributions as unfair.  
As my research shows, high levels of perceived distributive unfairness harm satisfaction 
with democracy, and thus undermine the widespread democratic “buy-in” that is crucial 
for democracy to consolidate (Linz & Stepan, 1996).   
Yet, my findings also provide some room for optimism, and they speak to broader 
themes in the literature on governance quality and corruption more generally.  By 
delivering quality governance—for instance, by combatting corruption—political 
authorities in democracies can effectively offset the negative influence of perceived 
distributive unfairness on political support, even in a context of high inequality. One way 
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to effectively combat corruption is to enhance political accountability.  A study of local 
governments in Brazil, for instance, found significantly less corruption in municipalities 
where mayors were eligible for reelection (Ferraz and Finan 2011).  Political authorities 
can also establish independent oversight organizations, such as audit institutions (Melo, 
Pereira, and Figueiredo 2009). 
Literature on governance quality and gender and politics has also suggested that 
incorporating more women into governmental office could prove a successful anti-
corruption reform. There is a robust and negative correlation between the presence of 
women in government and corruption (Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Dollar, Fisman, and 
Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001) that prior research has documented in legislative 
institutions (Stensöta, Wängnerud, and Svensson 2015) and in democracies with high 
electoral accountability (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018).  Moreover, women’s 
descriptive representation (Watson and Moreland 2014), as well as formal representation 
in the form of gender quotas (Schwindt-Bayer 2010), is associated with reduced 
suspicions of corruption among citizens.  These findings are bolstered by more recent 
research showing women to be less corrupt than men (Bauhr, Charron, & Wängnerud, 
2018; Wängnerud 2012), as well as evidence from survey experiments (Barnes, Beaulieu, 
& Saxton 2018) showing that citizens believe increasing women’s presence in 
government is successful for reducing corruption. Beyond bolstering satisfaction with 
democracy, low levels of corruption signal to citizens that government is not dominated 
by elites, that the democratic process is functioning properly, and that policies are being 
made and administered via fair, impartial, and transparent procedures.  In sum, 
democratic governments and political elites can foster accountability, transparency, and 
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rule of law.  When fair procedures for governing are in place, citizens may still perceive 
unfair distributive outcomes, but they are more likely to also believe that democracy is 
the most legitimate vehicle for addressing their country’s most pressing concerns.  As 
such, my findings suggest that initiatives aimed at reducing corruption, such as increasing 
the presence of historically marginalized groups in politics, could help bolster political 
support in the face of unfair distributive outcomes.   
 My findings also have important implications for political elites and elite 
discourse in the Americas.  The results in Chapter 4 demonstrate that when framed as a 
fair distributive outcome, inequality has less of a negative impact on political support 
than when framed as unfair or when individuals are left to make their own fairness 
judgments about rising inequality.  This is not to suggest that if political elites simply tell 
the masses that rising inequality is justifiable and fair, ordinary citizens will readjust their 
expectations about democracy.  Rather, it suggests that policy makers need to do a better 
job communicating to citizens what they are doing to try and combat poverty and 
inequality. When I was speaking with political elites in Argentina, for example, a 
frequent theme that emerged from my interviews was the ordinary citizens do not trust 
the legislature because they are not aware what their representatives actually do.  As a 
senator from Buenos Aires Province told me,  
“People don’t know anything about the legislature.  They don’t even know what 
goes on in this building.  But, things are getting much better with this government 
because they are trying to be transparent and communicate both the problems that 
the country is facing as well as what it’s doing to solve them.”27 
   
                                                 
27 Author interview, Senator for Buenos Aires province (Cambiemos), March 2019.   
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It is hard for citizens to trust their democratic institutions, such as the legislature, in the 
face of economic inequality when they view the political class unfavorably and have no 
idea whether or not their representatives are promoting their policy interests. But, when 
political elites can credibly signal to ordinary citizens that they are committed to 
combatting persistent poverty and inequality in society, individuals may still perceive the 
income distribution to be unfair or even very unfair, yet their political concerns should be 
allayed when they see their democratic government as the most legitimate vehicle for 
addressing distributive injustice.  
 
 
 
  
APPENDICES 
Appendix A.  Chapter 2 Supplementary Analysis 
 
Table A1. System Justifying Attitudes Predict Ideology (0=Left, 10=Right) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Inequality is justified .12***     
 (.01)     
People should take responsibility  .06***    
  (.01)    
Competition is good   .01   
   (.01)   
Hard work brings success    .02  
    (.01)  
Wealth accumulation is good     .03** 
     (.01) 
Statist economic preference .01 .01 .00 .00 .01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Political Interest -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Religiosity  -.07*** -.07*** -.08*** -.07*** -.07*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Income .03* .03* .04** .04* .04* 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Female .08 .07 .05 .06 .07 
 (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Age .00* .00* .00* .00* .00* 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Education -.06*** -.06*** -.06*** -.06*** -.06*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Support for Democracy  -.19*** -.20*** -.24*** -.22*** -.21*** 
 (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
Country Fixed Effects      
Brazil -.32** -.22 -.32** -.28* -.31* 
 (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) 
Chile -.01 -.08 -.11 -.09 -.09 
 (.14) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.15) 
Ecuador -.06 -.00 .00 .03 .03 
 (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) 
Mexico .65*** .74*** .69*** .72*** .70*** 
 (.11) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) 
Peru -.05 .06 .06 .08 .06 
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 (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) 
Uruguay -.78*** -.74*** -.74*** -.69*** -.72*** 
 (.14) (.14) (.14) (.14) (.14) 
Constant 5.71*** 6.08*** 6.46*** 6.28*** 6.14*** 
 (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.26) 
Observations 6881 6880 6831 6865 6814 
R2 .06 .05 .05 .04 .04 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors). OLS regression coefficients predicting political ideology 
(0=left to 10=right).  For country fixed effects, Argentina is excluded as the reference category.   
Note: Three of the five system justifying attitudes are significant predictors of rightist political ideology.   
 
 
 
APPENDIX B. Chapter 3 Supplementary Analysis 
 
 
Figure B1. Distribution of Unfairness Perceptions by Political Ideology 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the distribution of perceived distributive unfairness across the 
political ideology spectrum.  Responses are from the 2015 Latinobarometer and are 
pooled across all countries.    Figure B1 suggests that those on the political right are just 
as likely as those on the left to perceive the income distribution as unfair in Latin 
America, although the cross-national analysis in this chapter shows that, consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and support for 
the political system is weaker on the right side of the political spectrum.    
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Figure B2. Distribution of Governance Quality in Latin America 
 
Note: This figure shows the distribution of governance quality (control of corruption 
measure) in the Latin American countries in this sample.  Higher values indicate better 
governance, or less corruption.  Although the modal level of governance quality is on the 
“poor” side of the spectrum, there is still significant variation across the country-years 
being analyzed in Chapter 3.  
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Table B1. Perceived Unfairness and Satisfaction, Alternative Governance Measures 
 Rule of Law Voice and Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Perceived 
Unfairness 
-.57*** -.48*** -.57*** -.60*** -.57*** -.54*** 
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) 
Governance 
Quality 
.27** -.12 .39** -.11 .25* -.13 
(.10) (.13) (.13) (.17) (.12) (.16) 
Unfair X 
Governance 
 .19***  .23***  .19*** 
 (.05)  (.06)  (.06) 
Individual-Level       
Political Ideology 
0-10=Right 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Subjective Social 
Class 
.07*** .07*** .07*** .07*** .07*** .07*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Economic 
Perception Worse 
-.42*** -.42*** -.42*** -.42*** -.42*** -.42*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Education -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Rural .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .05 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Incumbent 
Approval 
.80*** .80*** .80*** .80*** .80*** .80*** 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Wealth Quintile .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Female -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Country-Level       
Income Inequality -.11*** -.11*** -.11*** -.11*** -.12*** -.12*** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Observations 40620 40620 40620 40620 40620 40620 
Country-Years 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Wald Chi2 4047.55 4197.03 4049.40 4179.57 4044.41 4145.95 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Standard errors). Multilevel ordered logit coefficients.   
Note: Results in Table B1 show that the findings in Chapter 3 are robust to other measures of 
governance quality, including WGI measures of Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, and 
Government Effectiveness.   
DV: How satisfied are you with the way democracy functions in your country? 1=very 
dissatisfied to 4=very satisfied.   
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Table B2. Perceived Unfairness and Trust, Alternative Governance Measures 
 Rule of Law Voice and Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Perceived 
Unfairness 
-.50*** -.42*** -.50*** -.52*** -.50*** -.47*** 
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.05) 
Governance Quality .15* -.30 .15 -.45 .18* -.32 
 (.07) (.19) (.10) (.24) (.09) (.23) 
Unfair X 
Governance 
 .16**  .21**  .17* 
 (.06)  (.08)  (.07) 
Individual-Level       
Political Ideology 0-
10=Right 
-.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Subjective Social 
Class 
.06*** .06*** .06*** .06*** .06*** .06*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Economic 
Perception Worse 
-.39*** -.39*** -.39*** -.39*** -.39*** -.39*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Education -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** -.01*** 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Rural .05* .05* .05* .05* .05* .05* 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Incumbent Approval 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Wealth Quintile .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Female -.04* -.04* -.04* -.04* -.04* -.04* 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Country-Level       
Income Inequality -.05** -.05** -.04** -.04** -.05** -.05** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Observations 41221 41221 41221 41221 41221 41221 
Country-Year 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Wald Chi2 7521.04 7564.39 7517.91 7561.94 7521.04 7556.20 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Standard errors). Multilevel ordered logit coefficients.   
Note: Results in Table B2 show that the findings in Chapter 3 are robust to other measures of 
governance quality, including WGI measures of Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, and 
Government Effectiveness.   
DV: How much trust do you have in the national government? 1=none to 4=a lot.  
 
 
  
 
 
 Appendix C: Chapter 4 Experimental Design, Sample Characteristics, and Additional 
Information  
 
Table C1. Sample Characteristics  
 Full  Manipulation Control Treat 1 Treat 2 Treat 3 
Age 40.93 39.60 39.34 40.87 40.55 38.87 
Ideology 5.40 5.52 5.53 5.65 5.53 5.44 
Class 2.30 2.65 2.67 2.74 2.67 2.57 
Education 3.92 3.95 4.02 3.96 3.97 3.88 
Female .49 .45 .52 .41 .37 .46 
Partisan .31 .31 .35 .31 .29 .35 
Note: This table shows the mean value for a variety of variables in the full sample (N=1,485), 
compared to the subsample who answered the manipulation check correctly (N=651), and each of 
the treatment and control groups who answered the manipulation check correctly.  As Table C2 
shows, none of these variables predict placement in the control or treatment group, whether 
among the full sample or among the manipulation check subsample (with the exception of sex in 
one instance).  
 
 
Table C2. Multinomial Logit Predicting Treatment 
 T1 Full  
T2 
Full  
T3 
Full  
T1 
Manipulation 
T2 
Manipulation 
T3  
Manipulation 
Ideology .02 -.04 -.06 .02 -.00 -.01 
 (.04) (.04) (.04) (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Class .07 .19 -.01 .07 -.07 -.26 
 (.13) (.13) (.13) (.20) (.19) (.19) 
Education -.13 -.04 -.08 -.12 -.04 -.10 
 (.10) (.10) (.10) (.14) (.14) (.14) 
Female -.19 -.24 -.16 -.47 -.72** -.39 
 (.17) (.17) (.17) (.25) (.24) (.24) 
Political 
Interest 
.09 .04 -.03 .07 -.05 -.12 
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.15) (.14) (.15) 
Partisan -.30 -.29 -.13 -.20 -.26 .07 
 (.20) (.20) (.20) (.27) (.26) (.26) 
Age .01 .01 .01 .00 .00 -.00 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Observations 1146 572 
Log 
Likelihood 19.5 19.5 
Note: Multinomial Logit Coefficients, Control group is the base category.  With the exception of 
women in the manipulation check subsample being more likely to be assigned to T2 (Inequality + 
Unfair) compared to the control, none of the other variables predicts placement in treatment 
groups in either sample.   
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Table C.3 Average Treatment Effects, Satisfaction with Democracy, Full Sample 
 Control 
ATE=2.80 
N=281 
 
Inequality 
ATE=2.57 
N=297 
Diff= -.23** 
Inequality + Unfair 
ATE=2.63 
N=307 
Diff= -.17* 
Inequality + Fair 
ATE=2.59 
N=295 
Diff= -.21** 
Note: Two-tailed t-tests comparing each treatment to the control group *p<.10, **p<.05, 
***p<.01 
DV: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Argentina? 1=Very dissatisfied to 
5=Very satisfied 
 
Average treatment effects for the “Inequality” and “Inequality + Unfair” compared to the control 
group are generally consistent with those from the subsample that answered the manipulation 
check question correctly.  However, participants in the full sample appear less likely to have 
successfully received the “Inequality + Fair” treatment.   
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Table C4. Inequality, Fairness Frames, & Satisfaction with Democracy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment 1 (Inequality) -.26* -.30* -.21 -.83 
 (.13) (.13) (.38) (.58) 
Treatment 2 (Ineq.+ Unfair) -.23 -.26* -.28 -1.29* 
 (.13) (.12) (.37) (.52) 
Treatment 3 (Ineq. + Fair) -.18 -.16 -.36 -.77 
 (.13) (.13) (.36) (.53) 
Political Ideology (0=Left to 10=Right)  .12*** .12** .12*** 
  (.02) (.04) (.02) 
Treatment 1 X Ideology   -.02  
   (.06)  
Treatment 2 X Ideology   .00  
   (.06)  
Treatment 3 X Ideology   .04  
   (.06)  
Subjective Social Class   .25*** .25*** .04 
  (.07) (.07) (.14) 
Treatment 1 X Class    .20 
    (.21) 
Treatment 2 X Class    .39* 
    (.19) 
Treatment 3 X Class    .23 
    (.20) 
Female  .06 .06 .06 
  (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Political Interest  .01 .01 .01 
  (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Education  -.05 -.05 -.05 
  (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Role of the State  -.08* -.08* -.08* 
  (.04) (.04) (.04) 
Constant 2.85*** 2.05*** 2.10*** 2.58*** 
 (.09) (.41) (.46) (.53) 
Observations 584 576 576 576 
R2 .01 .11 .11 .12 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors) OLS regression coefficients. Control group 
excluded as reference category.  
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Experimental Setup, United States 
Participants began by answering two pre-treatment questions meant to measure their 
perceptions of economic inequality and their perceptions of distributive unfairness in the 
United States.  The question about inequality perceptions asked whether the gap between 
the rich and the poor in the United States had gotten “much smaller” (coded 1), “smaller” 
(2), “about the same” (3), “bigger” (4), or “much bigger” (5) in the last 20 years.  The 
question about perceived distributive unfairness asked whether the income distribution in 
the United States was “very fair” (coded 1), “fair” (2), “unfair” (3), or “very unfair” (4).  
Next, I randomly assigned each of the 1,500 survey participants to receive one of three 
experimental treatments, or to be in the control group.28 Specifically, each participant 
was randomly assigned to read one of the following vignettes: 
 
“In 2008, the United States experienced the most severe economic crisis since the Great 
Depression.  Today, both the stock market and the unemployment rate are back to pre-
recession levels…” 
 
Control: No sentence 
 
Treatment 1 (Inequality Information): Still, many Americans’ economic situations 
have actually gotten worse.  According to recent figures, the gap between the richest 5% 
and the poorest 25% is more than 6 times larger than it was before the recession. 
 
Treatment 2: (Inequality + Unfair Outcome): Still, many Americans’ economic 
situations have actually gotten worse.  According to recent figures, the gap between the 
richest 5% and the poorest 25% is more than 6 times larger than it was before the 
recession. An independent economic think-tank explained, it is fundamentally unfair that 
the recovery has disproportionately benefitted the wealthiest Americans. 29 
 
Treatment 3: (Inequality + Fair Outcome): Still, many Americans’ economic 
situations have actually gotten worse.  According to recent figures, the gap between the 
richest 5% and the poorest 25% is more than 6 times larger than it was before the 
recession.  An independent economic think-tank explained, it is fundamentally fair that 
economic recoveries benefit some groups more than others, because that’s just the nature 
of capitalism.   
 
After reading one of the above vignettes, each participant was asked to indicate their trust 
in the federal government: “How often can you trust the federal government in 
Washington to do what is right? Never (coded 1), Some of the time (2), About half the 
time (3), Most of the time (4), Always (5)?” 
 
  
                                                 
28 I used the “question randomization” option in Qualtrics to randomly assign 
participants to treatments or the control group.   
29 Emphasis added – not italicized in the original vignette. 
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Table C5. Ordered Logit Predicting Trust in the Government, U.S. Experiment  
 Model 1 Model 2 
T1: Inequality Information -.49*** -.48 
 (.15) (.40) 
T2: Inequality Information + Unfair -.43** -.67^ 
 (.15) (.38) 
T3: Inequality Information + Fair -.23 -1.04** 
 (.15) (.40) 
Political Ideology (Very Conservative=5) .02 -.07 
 (.05) (.09) 
T1: Inequality X Ideology   -.01 
  (.13) 
T2: Inequality + Unfair X Ideology   .08 
  (.12) 
T3: Inequality + Fair X Ideology  .28* 
  (.13) 
Female  -.07 -.05 
 (.11) (.11) 
Education -.08^ -.08^ 
 (.04) (.04) 
Class Self-Identification  .42*** .43*** 
 (.07) (.07) 
Race (White=1) -.41** -.43** 
 (.13) (.13) 
Political Interest .24*** .23*** 
 (.07) (.07) 
Economic Situation Worse -.12* -.12* 
 (.06) (.06) 
Cut 1 -1.57*** -1.83*** 
 (.39) (.44) 
Cut 2 1.06** .81^ 
 (.39) (.44) 
Cut 3 2.64*** 2.40*** 
 (.40) (.45) 
Cut 4 4.99*** 4.75*** 
 (.47) (.52) 
Observations 1,339 1,339 
Log Likelihood  1569 1566 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, Standard errors in parentheses. 
Ordered logit coefficients, DV (1-5, 5= “Always” Trust). Control group excluded as the reference 
category.   
Consistent with the results in Table 2, treatments 1 and 2 are associated with significantly lower 
levels of trust, compared to the control group, whereas treatment 3 is not. 
 
  
145 
 
Experimental Setup, Mexico 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to read some version of the following vignette:  
 
Control: La economía en México creció 2.3 por ciento en 2017.  
 
T1: La economía en México creció 2.3 por ciento en 2017. A pesar del reciente 
crecimiento económico, la diferencia de ingresos entre ricos y pobres ha aumentado en 
México.  
 
T2. La economía en México creció 2.3 por ciento en 2017. A pesar del reciente 
crecimiento económico, la diferencia de ingresos entre ricos y pobres ha aumentado en 
México.  Según una organización independiente y sin fines de lucro, el aumento en la 
desigualdad de ingresos es un resultado injusto del crecimiento económico. 
 
T3: La economía en México creció 2.3 por ciento en 2017. A pesar del reciente 
crecimiento económico, la diferencia de ingresos entre ricos y pobres ha aumentado en 
México.  Según una organización independiente y sin fines de lucro, el aumento en la 
desigualdad de ingresos es un resultado justo del crecimiento económico. 
 
Teniendo esto en cuenta, mire esta escala y dígame, cuánta confianza tiene usted en el 
Gobierno Nacional: mucha (1), algo (2), poco (3), o ninguna (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX D: Chapter 5 Experimental Design and Sample Characteristics 
 
Table D1. Sample Characteristics  
 Full Manip T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Age 40.93 40.67 40.44 37.98 37.58 47.82 39.25 43.03 
Ideology 5.40 5.36 5.33 5.34 4.50 6.46 4.94 6.04 
Class 2.60 2.56 2.54 2.53 2.42 2.82 2.46 2.67 
Education 3.92 3.89 3.90 3.85 3.83 4.13 3.77 3.94 
Female .50 .54 .53 .49 .53 .58 .57 .52 
Partisan .31 .30 .24 .18 .30 .41 .28 .39 
Note: This table shows the mean value for a variety of variables in the full sample (N=1,577), 
compared to the subsample who answered the manipulation check correctly (N=624), and each of 
the treatment and control groups who answered the manipulation check correctly.  In Appendix 
Tables D6 and D7 I use these participant characteristics to predict assignment to treatment 
groups.   
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Table D2. Experimental Vignettes 
Treatment 1: 
Theft Same 
En años recientes, la prestación de servicios públicos en la Argentina 
ha permanecido igual, mientras que el uso de recursos públicos para 
fines indebidos por funcionarios del gobierno ha permanecido 
igual. Al mismo tiempo, la brecha en la distribución del ingreso entre 
ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado creciendo.    
Treatment 2: 
Bribes Same 
Según analistas independientes, el numero de funcionarios del 
gobierno que acepten las coimas ha permanecido igual en los 
últimos años.  Al mismo tiempo, la brecha en la distribución del 
ingreso entre ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado creciendo. 
Treatment 3: 
Theft 
Increasing 
En años recientes, la prestación de servicios públicos en la Argentina 
ha empeorado, mientras que el uso de recursos públicos para fines 
indebidos por funcionarios del gobierno ha ido en aumento. 
Además de estas deficiencias, la brecha en la distribución del ingreso 
entre ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado creciendo. 
Treatment 4: 
Theft 
Decreasing 
En años recientes, la prestación de servicios públicos en la Argentina 
ha mejorado, mientras que el uso de recursos públicos para fines 
indebidos por funcionarios del gobierno ha declinado. A pesar de 
estos progresos, la brecha en la distribución del ingreso entre ricos y 
pobres en la Argentina ha continuado creciendo. 
Treatment 5: 
Bribes 
Increasing 
Según analistas independientes, el numero de funcionarios del 
gobierno que acepten las coimas ha aumentado en los últimos 
años. Además de estas deficiencias, la brecha en la distribución del 
ingreso entre ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado 
creciendo.   
Treatment 6: 
Bribes 
Decreasing  
Según analistas independientes, el numero de funcionarios del 
gobierno que acepten las coimas ha disminuido en los últimos 
años. A pesar de estos progresos, la brecha en la distribución del 
ingreso entre ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado 
creciendo.   
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Table D3. Average Treatment Effects, Perceived Unfairness, Full Sample 
 Theft of Resources  
Same 
ATE=3.27 
N=280 
Increasing 
ATE=3.20 
N=248 
Diff= -.07 
Decreasing 
ATE=3.34 
N=297 
Diff= .06 
 Bribery  
Same 
ATE=3.26 
N=235 
Increasing 
ATE=3.31 
N=259 
Diff= .05 
Decreasing 
ATE=3.31 
N=254 
Diff=.05 
Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” treatments to 
the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
DV: Perceived fairness of income distribution 1= “Very Fair” to 4= “Very Unfair” 
 
 
Table D4. Average Treatment Effects, Satisfaction, Full Sample 
 Theft of Resources  
Same 
ATE=2.50 
N=280 
Increasing 
ATE=2.60 
N=248 
Diff= .10 
Decreasing 
ATE=2.52 
N=297 
Diff= .02 
 Bribery  
Same 
ATE=2.35 
N=235 
Increasing 
ATE=2.50 
N=259 
Diff= .15* 
Decreasing 
ATE=2.54 
N=254 
Diff=.19** 
Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” treatments to 
the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
DV: Satisfaction with democracy 1= “Very Dissatisfied” to 5= “Very satisfied” 
 
 
Table D5. Average Treatment Effects, Trust, Full Sample 
 Theft of Resources  
Same 
ATE=2.15 
N=280 
Increasing 
ATE=2.18 
N=248 
Diff= .03 
Decreasing 
ATE=2.18 
N=297 
Diff= .03 
 Bribery  
Same 
ATE=2.10 
N=235 
Increasing 
ATE=2.19 
N=259 
Diff= .09 
Decreasing 
ATE=2.14 
N=254 
Diff= .04 
Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” treatments to 
the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
DV: Trust in the national government 1= “Very Fair” to 4= “Very Unfair” 
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Table D6. Multinomial Logit Predicting Treatment, Full Sample 
 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Ideology .01 -.04 .03 .01 .00 
 (.05) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.05) 
Class -.02 .05 .03 -.05 -.10 
 (.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) 
Education -.04 -.01 .05 .03 -.03 
 (.11) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) 
Female -.19 -.14 .10 -.10 -.08 
 (.18) (.18) (.17) (.18) (.18) 
Political Interest  -.09 -.20 -.18 -.05 -.33** 
 (.11) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) 
Partisan .05 -.04 -.02 -.03 .40* 
 (.21) (.21) (.20) (.20) (.20) 
Age -.00 -.00 .00 -.00 -.01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Observations 1540 
Log Likelihood -2739.29 
 
 
Table D7. Multinomial Logit Predicting Treatment, Manipulation Check 
 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Ideology .01 -.25** .25** -.11 .16 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
Class .02 -.14 .38 -.11 .21 
 (.22) (.21) (.25) (.20) (.23) 
Education .01 .01 .17 -.12 .03 
 (.17) (.17) (.18) (.16) (.17) 
Female -.25 -.08 .31 .12 -.05 
 (.30) (.29) (.32) (.28) (.30) 
Political Interest -.17 -.30 -.14 -.01 -.44* 
 (.18) (.17) (.19) (.16) (.18) 
Partisan -.19 .50 .68 .24 .87* 
 (.38) (.34) (.36) (.33) (.35) 
Age -.01 -.01 .03* -.00 .01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Observations 609 
Log Likelihood -1021.19   
Multinomial logit coefficients, “theft same” treatment is the base category.  Generally 
speaking, none of these participant characteristics predict assignment to treatment groups.  
In both the full and reduced sample, politically interested individuals are slightly less 
likely to be assigned to the “bribery decreasing” treatment, compared to the “theft same” 
treatment.  Those who identify with a political party are slightly more likely to be 
assigned to the “bribery decreasing treatment.”  Political ideology also predicts 
assignment to Treatments 3 and 4 (compared to Treatment 1) in the reduced sample.   
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